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Abstract 
Using a large sample of post-2001 mergers, we show that three components of targets’ intellectual 
property account for 25% to 33% of merger value creation. In particular, we show that R&D, 
Technology, and Trademarks generate greater synergies than acquired net tangible assets and 
goodwill. We also find that acquiring targets’ customer bases is associated with lower synergies 
and that acquirers overpay for goodwill. Our findings are robust to using conventional and novel 
wealth effect estimates. They suggest that information about the economic value of acquired assets 
drawn from price allocation disclosures enables researchers to simultaneously study multiple 
sources of synergy. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the role of target firms’ intellectual property and contractual 
relationships on value creation in mergers. Our investigation extends prior work on the nature of 
merger synergies as intellectual property encompasses not only patents and on-going R&D 
activities, but also unpatented technologies, trade secrets, internally developed software/IT 
processes, and trademarks. This is important because these various sources of intellectual property 
are economically significant relative to patents.1 In addition, target firms’ customer relationships 
and contractual rights (e.g., lease or service agreements) have, to our knowledge, not been studied 
in the context of merger wealth effects. Using a large sample of post-2001 mergers for which we 
extract merger-specific information about the nature and value of acquired assets from SEC filings 
disclosing merger price allocations, we find that the components of the target’s intellectual property 
account for 25% to 33% of total merger value creation.2    
Our evidence relating merger price allocation disclosures to merger wealth effects is of 
interest to M&A researchers for four reasons. First, exploiting merger-specific economic data in 
large samples arguably overcomes one of the main reasons for why evidence on the source of merger 
synergies is scarce (e.g., Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001; Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn 
2008). Second, our data enable us to simultaneously study the relative importance of multiple 
sources of synergy. This contrasts with prior work which, with the exception of Devos et al.’s (2009) 
                                                          
1 Cohen et al. (2000) show that patents tend to be less emphasized than other forms of intellectual property in 
manufacturing industries. Rowe (2009) estimates the value of the trade secrets of U.S. public firms at $5 trillion, while 
by comparison, we estimate the economic value of patents issued from 1992 to 2008 in the Kogan et al. (2017) database 
at $12.5 trillion (in 2008 dollars). Further, Potepa and Welch (2017) argue that many innovative firms such as Airbnb, 
Netflix, and Uber derive most of their value from unpatented technology, software, and trademarks.  
2 Since 2001, publicly traded firms have been required to provide finer disclosures about their acquisitive activities. 
That is, in addition to disclosing the target’s tangible net assets and goodwill firms are also required to disclose the 
economic value of all other identifiable intangibles acquired, including the target’s previously unreported intangible 
assets (e.g., R&D, Technology, Trademarks, Contractual Rights, and Customer Relationships). The valuations that 
underlie the allocation of the merger price are reliable to the extent that they are determined by an independent appraiser 
and audited by an independent auditor. 
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analysis of a sample of merged Value Line firms, has focused on studying a single source of synergy 
at a time (e.g., reduction in expected expropriation costs in Beneish et al. (2008), product market 
synergy in Hoberg and Philips (2010), and innovation synergy in Bena and Li (2014)). Third, the 
economic values we use are likely to capture merger-specific synergies more precisely and more 
completely than commonly available surrogates. For example, we find that targets have no prior 
patents in 30% of the deals in which acquirers buy technology-related intangibles. This highlights 
the importance of unpatented technology, proprietary computer software, and trade secrets in the 
acquisition of technology-related assets. Further, we find that acquirers do not recognize 
innovation-related intangibles in 45% of the targets that have investments in R&D, suggesting that 
not all R&D activities of the target have value for the combined firm.3   
Finally, we relate purchase price allocations to conventional and alternative measurements 
of merger wealth effects. Specifically, we introduce a new measure that builds on prior work and 
adjusts the conventional three-day acquirer price reaction for partially anticipated merger 
announcements and signals about an acquirer’s incentives to engage in acquisitions (e.g., 
overvaluation, limited organic growth opportunities) that are often revealed at the announcement 
of a deal. In addition, a second alternative measure is our implementation of Wang’s (2018) 
suggestion to adjust the acquirer price reaction for estimated synergy losses in exogenously 
withdrawn deals.  
We argue that purchase price allocation disclosures (PPA) enable researchers to ex post 
identify sources of synergy expected by investors at the time of the merger announcement. This is 
                                                          
3 The market values of four major types of intangible assets as disclosed in the purchase price allocation are related to 
previously used proxies for innovation and marketing synergies, but while positive, the correlations are generally 
modest in magnitude. For example, we find correlation coefficients of .17 between patents and allocations to R&D 
and of .16 between patents and allocations to technology. Similarly, we find a correlation of .29 between pre-merger 
advertising expenditures and the proportion of the purchase price allocated to trademarks. 
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plausible if either (1) investors have rational expectations about the value of the target’s 
identifiable assets across states of nature (i.e., standalone vs. acquired), or (2) deal announcements 
update investors’ expectations about the probabilities of different states of nature and the value of 
the target’s identifiable assets in the state in which the proposed merger occurs (based on, for 
example, information revealed at deal announcement in press releases, investor and analyst 
presentations, or conference calls). To further evaluate our argument, we examine the market 
reaction to the subsequent SEC filing that discloses the allocation, which occurs approximately 
three (seven) months after deal completion (announcement). We find no significant market 
reaction around the SEC filing date. We further find that the SEC filing date returns are not related 
to either the merger announcement returns or the values of allocated merger prices.4 We interpret 
these findings as evidence that subsequent SEC filings of PPA do not alter investors’ estimates of 
the economic value of acquired assets.  
Our sample consists of 447 mergers involving publicly traded bidders and targets from 2001 
to 2015, based on the intersection of SDC, CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and the Pratt’s Stats database 
from which we collect the purchase price allocation as disclosed in the SEC filings. We focus on 
acquisitions of public targets because the availability of stock prices and returns allows us to evaluate 
synergies and their distribution among acquirer and target shareholders. As we later detail, our 
sample of 447 deals is representative of the 1,746 deals involving public acquirers and targets 
based on the broader intersection of SDC, CRSP, and COMPUSTAT over the same period. 
Our results include the following. First, the merger wealth effects we document are generally 
consistent with prior research. During the three days surrounding the merger announcement, we find 
                                                          
4 Our finding of no market reaction is consistent with Shalev (2009), but in conflict with Paugam et al. (2015) and 
Liang and Yeung (2017). We show that the market reaction to the 10-Q/10-K filing that contains the PPA disclosure 
is driven by a small subset of firms that concurrently release their earnings. In effect, there is no detectable market 
reaction associated with PPA disclosures that are not contaminated by concurrent earnings releases. 
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that, on average, acquirers lose (targets gain) -1.1% (26.5%) of their market value and that synergy 
gains average 2.9% of the combined merger value, with targets gaining on average 4.6 cents more 
than acquirers for each dollar of combined pre-merger market values. In contrast, when we re-
measure acquirer wealth effects and adjust for anticipation, industry shocks, and signals unrelated to 
the deal but informative about the acquirer’s standalone value, we find that, on average, acquirers 
gain 0.6% of their market value, synergy gains average 4.3 % of the combined merger value, and 
target gains decline to an average of 3.3 cents more than acquirers for each dollar of combined pre-
merger market values. 
Second, we find that synergies are higher in deals in which a greater portion of the purchase 
price is allocated to the intellectual property of the target. Specifically, we find a positive relation 
between various measures of deal synergies and the portion of the purchase price allocated to (1) 
R&D, (2) patented and unpatented technology, trade secrets and software (i.e., acquired 
technology), and (3) trademarks. Our evidence on innovation is consistent with Bena and Li’s 
(2014) conclusion that combining innovation is a source of merger synergy. However, whereas Bena 
and Li suggest that, conditional on overlapping innovation, the likelihood of business combination 
is lower for firms operating in the same output markets, our results are driven by related rather than 
by diversifying acquisitions.  Indeed, we find that synergies arising from the intellectual property 
of the target are economically significant in the subset of related deals: evaluated at the mean, 
allocations to R&D, acquired technology, and trademarks, account for 0.28%, 0.48%, and 0.27% 
of the combined merger value, respectively, which in total represents one-third of the average 
synergy gain of 3.1% in the subsample of related acquisitions. Based on our re-measured synergy 
gains, we find that the allocations to these asset classes represent approximately 25% of total 
merger value creation. On the other hand, we find that synergies are smaller if a greater portion of 
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the purchase price is allocated to client relationships (e.g., contracts with existing customers). This 
is consistent with arguments that revenue synergies are more difficult to achieve and that 
integrating sales forces and preventing client cannibalization is often challenging (e.g., Houston, 
et al. 2001; Cullinan, et al. 2004, Devos, et al. 2009; E&Y 2013, Chartier, et al. 2017). 
Third, we investigate how the synergy gains are shared between acquirer and target 
shareholders. We find a positive relation between acquired R&D/technology and the premium paid 
to target shareholders, but no evidence of a relation with acquirer announcement returns. This 
suggests that most of the synergies arising from the target’s intellectual property flow to target 
shareholders. In contrast, we find that synergies from acquiring trademarks mainly flow to the 
acquirer. That is, we find that the premium paid is no different in deals with a greater allocation to 
trademarks and that acquirers gain from buying trademarks. Finally, we find that goodwill is not 
associated with higher synergies, but that acquirers pay a higher premium and experience more 
adverse shareholder wealth effects in deals in which a greater portion of the purchase price is 
allocated to goodwill. These findings suggest that acquirers overpay for deals with a substantial 
amount of goodwill.  
Overall, our evidence validates the use of purchase price allocation disclosures to study 
merger wealth effects. Our findings on the synergistic value of targets’ intellectual property 
underscore the importance of using more precise and complete proxies for potentially synergistic 
activities. In addition, the measure we propose to estimate acquirer (and thus combined) wealth 
effects builds on and adds to prior work as its adjustments for merger anticipation, acquirer signaling, 
and industry effects are easily implementable.   
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2. Empirical Framework 
2.1 Related Literature 
There is extensive evidence of positive estimates of aggregate value creation from mergers. 
Yet, whereas theoretical justifications for synergy gains are abundant, without access to detailed 
merger-specific data researchers have historically found it difficult to identify the sources of such 
gains, even in smaller samples and clinical studies (e.g., Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Kaplan, 2000; 
Andrade et al. 2001).5 Our work is related to three types of studies that have recently attempted to 
document the motivations underlying mergers. 
First, there are studies that focus on smaller samples with detailed economic information 
about individual acquisitions. Beneish et al. (2008) draw on data that became publicly available as 
a result of the tobacco litigation settlement to study acquisitions by a small group of homogenous 
firms in the tobacco industry. They show that geographic diversification enables tobacco firms to 
influence politicians in a greater number of political districts and transforms excess financial assets 
into physical and intangible assets of non-tobacco operations, thereby reducing expected 
expropriation costs. Devos et al. (2009) study a sample of 264 mergers involving firms followed 
by Value Line from 1980-2004. By exploiting Value Line forecasts of earnings, revenues, cash 
flows, and investments of acquirers, targets, and the combined firm, Devos et al. show that value 
creation stems from operating synergies in related mergers and from tax savings in diversifying 
mergers.   
Second, several studies have examined a particular source of synergy in larger samples. 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) focus on product market synergies described as the ability of merging 
                                                          
5 Synergistic gains have been suggested to arise from (1) exploiting economies of scale, (2) obtaining operating 
synergies from vertical integration, (3) obtaining tax benefits, (4) replacing inefficient management, (5) increasing 
debt capacity, and (6) creating an improved internal capital market (e.g., Teece, 1980; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; 
Healy et al., 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).    
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firms to create new and unique products that complement an acquirer’s existing range of products 
and enable the merged firm to better differentiate itself from its rivals.  
They find that firms with more similar product market language are more likely to engage in a 
merger, experience higher announcement returns during an 11-day window [-10, 0], and generate 
higher profitability and greater growth in sales and product descriptions in the long run. Related 
to innovation, Sevilir and Tian (2012) suggest that merger wealth effects are greater when the 
target has filed for at least one patent during the three years prior to the merger and conclude that 
acquiring innovation creates value. Bena and Li (2014) use both textual analysis and patent data and 
find greater patent output post-merger, suggesting that synergies arise when acquisitions involve 
complementary R&D activities. Our study differs because we examine detailed information about 
several sources of synergy simultaneously and because our analysis of announcement returns 
enables us to estimate the expected value of synergies.     
 Finally, our work is also related to research that examines post-merger long-run performance 
and changes in firm behavior.6 However, in contrast to these studies, we focus on studying value 
creation at merger announcements, to avoid concerns that post-merger improvements could be 
related to either unobservable common shocks (Andrade et al. 2001) or changes in the business 
strategy that are unrelated to the merger (Philips and Zdanov 2013), instead of anticipated merger 
synergies.    
                                                          
6 Healy et al. (1992) and Andrade et al. (2001) show that merged firms’ accounting profitability improves relative to 
their industry peers during the two to five years following a merger. Using manufacturers’ plant-level data, 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Schoar (2002) present improvements in Total Factor Productivity during two 
years after mergers. Specifically, acquirers reduce target’s wage rates, material inputs, and investments, but the 
corresponding outputs do not decline proportionally (Li, 2013), and acquirers sell productivity-declining plants and 
retain productivity-enhancing plants after mergers (Maksimovic et al. 2011). More recent studies focus on different 
aspects of synergistic gains for non-manufacturing firms. In the consumer goods industry, Sheen (2014) documents 
an increase in product quality and a decrease in selling prices up to five years after mergers. On the other hand, Seru 
(2014) focuses on innovative industries and finds that successfully merged firms produce more and higher quality 
patents than firms failed to be acquired due to reasons other than R&D activities. 
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Our approach is based on detailed economic information about the target. Specifically, 
since 2001 publicly traded firms are required to disclose the economic value of all identifiable 
assets acquired. Thus, in addition to the target’s tangible net assets and goodwill, acquirers disclose 
the value of all other identifiable intangibles acquired, including the target’s previously unreported 
intangible assets. These assets include R&D, technology, trademarks, contractual rights, and 
customer relationships, which we describe in more detail in Appendix A. Importantly, we believe 
that these expanded disclosures and the valuations disclosed in the purchase price allocation can 
overcome many of the limitations in prior literature. First, as purchase price allocation disclosures 
are mandated by the SEC, we are able to examine a large sample of mergers. Second, because the 
asset valuations are deal-specific and typically independently generated and audited, they are more 
precise and complete than commonly used proxies.7 Third, having detailed target-specific 
economic information about the nature of all acquired assets enables us to simultaneously 
investigate various sources of synergies at the time of merger announcements.  
2.2 Relating Merger Wealth Effects to Purchase Price Allocations 
We define ΔMVE_ACQ as the change in acquirer’s market value of equity from day -2 to 
the day after the merger announcement and define ACAR as the acquirer’s cumulative market 
adjusted abnormal return from day -1 to day +1. We similarly define the wealth effect on target 
shareholders in dollars (ΔMVE_TGT) and in percentages (TCAR). In addition to this conventional 
estimate, we consider two alternative measures of acquirer wealth effects. The alternative measures 
begin with the conventional three-day market-adjusted (or market and industry-adjusted) price 
                                                          
7 Values are typically determined by independent appraisers based on the “highest and best use” value in the most 
advantageous market and audited by the firm’s independent auditors. Appraisers tend to view the concept of highest 
and best use as “the single most important issue to appraising” (Munizzo and Virruso-Musial 2009, p. 100). In the 
accounting standard governing acquisitions, highest and best use is defined as “the use of a nonfinancial asset by 
market participants that would maximize the value of the asset...within which the asset would be used” (Accounting 
Standard Codification 820-10-35-10A).   
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reaction to deal announcements. We then make adjustments to disentangle the signaling effects of 
the merger announcement and to rescale the price reaction for the extent to which an acquisition by 
a given firm is anticipated. Appendix B details our proposed alternative estimation of acquirer wealth 
effects as well as our implementation of Wang’s (2018) suggestion to adjust the three-day price 
reaction for estimated synergy losses in exogenously withdrawn deals.  
We estimate synergy gains by combining acquirer and target shareholder wealth effects 
(SYNERGY = ΔMVE_TGT + ΔMVE_ACQ), following Bradley et al. (1988) and measure the 
distribution of those gains (DISTRIBUTION = ΔMVE_TGT - ΔMVE_ACQ), following Ahern 
(2012). Based on prior studies, we posit that the acquirer wealth effect (ΔMVE_ACQ) is the sum 
of two components: (1) investors’ assessment of the net present value of the proposed merger as an 
investment (NPV) and (2) a signaling component about the firm’s management, the value of its 
equity, or its future growth prospects (SIGNAL).8 We view the target wealth effect (ΔMVE_TGT) 
as the takeover premium, computed as the difference between the purchase price (PURCHASE 
PRICE) and the target’s market value of equity prior to merger announcement (TMVE_PRIOR).  
The target wealth effect can be construed as the difference between the ‘synergistic’ value of the 
target as perceived by acquirer’s management and the standalone value of the target. This enables us 
to rewrite synergy as follows:  
SYNERGY = PURCHASE PRICE - TMVE_PRIOR + NPV + SIGNAL            (1) 
                                                          
8 Prior research has investigated several explanations for acquirer wealth losses including (1) that diversification 
occurs for the benefit of managers (i.e., as a means of managers to protect their equity-contingent wealth and human 
capital and reap private rewards (the agency cost hypothesis; Jensen 1986)), (2) that acquiring firms’ managers 
overestimate their ability to manage the target company and overpay for acquisitions (the hubris hypothesis; Roll 
1986), (3) that acquisitions paid for with equity signal that the equity of the acquirer is overvalued (the overvaluation 
hypothesis; Travlos 1987; Fuller et al. 2002; Moeller et al. 2004), (4) that acquisitions signal reduced internal growth 
opportunities (the growth opportunity hypothesis; McCardle and Viswanathan 1994), and (5) that the negative returns 
are induced by price pressure resulting from the actions of arbitrageurs (Mitchell et al. 2004).  
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The purchase price allocation consists of the sum of the fair values of the target’s 
identifiable assets under the combined firm and goodwill as a remainder from the price negotiated 
by acquirer’s management. It is thus the sum of the fair values of target’s tangible net assets 
(FVTNAMERGER), goodwill (GWLMERGER), and identifiable intangible assets (INTGMERGER), most 
of which were previously unreported. Although, we view the value of a firm as reflecting an 
expectation of value across states of nature, including some with low probabilities where the firm 
is either acquired or fails, we posit for simplicity that TMVE_PRIOR is the sum of three 
unobservable components: the fair value of tangible net assets (FVTNAALONE), the fair value of 
recorded and unrecorded intangibles (INTGALONE), and the value of recorded and unrecorded 
goodwill (GWLALONE), all as perceived by investors assuming the target continues as currently 
organized and managed (i.e., as a standalone entity). Substituting, we can rewrite (1) as suggesting 
that purchase price allocations help assess the source of merger synergies by identifying differences 
in the standalone vs. merged value of the target’s identifiable assets.    
SYNERGY = (FVTNAMERGER + INTGMERGER +GWLMERGER)  
– (FVTNAALONE + INTGALONE + GWLALONE) + NPV + SIGNAL      (2) 
Our empirical specification of equation (2) is as follows. First, we distinguish seven 
categories of intangibles from the purchase price allocation: R&D, technology, trademarks, client 
relationships, contractual rights, other intangibles, and goodwill. The fraction of the deal value 
represented by each of these categories represents our test variables, with the allocation to the 
target’s tangible net assets serving as a reference category. Second, the fair values of the target’s 
intangible assets prior to the merger (e.g., stand-alone values) are not observable by researchers 
regardless of whether they are reported in financial statements or not. Consequently, we include 
proxies to capture market participants’ estimations of the values of these intangible assets prior to 
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merger announcements. That is, we include the book values of pre-merger existing intangibles that 
are reported on the target’s balance sheet prior to the merger. In addition, prior studies show that 
investors also value unreported intangible assets derived from R&D and advertising activities (e.g., 
Joos and Plesko 2005). Therefore, we include the estimated pre-merger market valuation of 
unrecorded R&D assets and trademarks following the procedures in Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and 
Penman and Zhang (2002).  
The last two components of equation (2) relate to the change in acquirer shareholder wealth, 
which measures the extent to which the merger is a positive or negative NPV investment and may 
reflect a SIGNAL component that is unrelated to the value-creation of the deal. If there is no 
signaling component, a positive (negative) acquirer return indicates investors’ belief that the acquirer 
has underpaid (overpaid) for the target. However, as some form of signaling is likely and given that 
the NPV and SIGNAL components are not separately observable, our analyses attempt to control 
for the agency costs, equity overvaluation, and growth opportunities inherent in SIGNAL. In 
addition, we control for the possibility that acquisition activity is anticipated as one can expect a 
muted market reaction to (partially) anticipated deals. 
Given evidence on the value of diversification in prior work, we also conduct our analysis 
on a sample partitioned based on whether the deal is related or diversifying.9 The underlying idea is 
that the likelihood of synergies is lower and that of overpayment higher when acquisitions are 
diversifying. To the extent that synergies are less likely, we expect the information from purchase 
price allocations to be less useful for diversifying mergers. 
                                                          
9 Prior research consistently reports negative or zero abnormal returns for firms announcing diversifying acquisitions 
and a number of studies have provided evidence consistent with either Jensen’s free-cash-flow hypothesis--in which 
the negative returns represent agency costs, or Rolls’ hubris hypothesis--in which the negative returns represent 
managers miscalculations that result in overpayments (e.g., see Jensen 1986; Roll 1986; Shleifer and Vishny 1989; 
Harford 1999; Bruner 2002; Moeller et al. 2004).  In large-sample studies of diversifying acquisitions, the costs from 
hubris and agency concerns apparently outweigh any benefits from improved financial or operating efficiency.  
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3. Method 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The principal analyses in this paper are based on a sample of completed deals announced 
between 2001-2015, involving public acquirers and targets at the intersection of SDC, CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT, and the Pratt’s Stats database from which we collect purchase price allocations as 
reported in SEC filings. As described in Table 1, Panel A, from the 2,755 SDC completed deals 
involving public acquirers and targets for which we have data in both CRSP and Compustat, we drop 
138 deals with deal values less than $5 million, 395 deals in the which the deal value is less than 1 
percent of the acquirer’s market capitalization, 83 deals in which the acquirer previously owned a 
controlling interest (i.e., 50% or more of the target), and 393 deals with missing Compustat data. Out 
of the remaining 1,746 deals, we identify 447 deals (approximately 26%) for which the Pratt’s Stats 
database contains a textual summary of the purchase price allocation extracted from the audited SEC 
filing. We further verify the accuracy of the Pratt’s textual data by manually checking the information 
in Pratt’s with the original SEC filing.   
In Table 1, Panel B, we compare our final sample (N=447) to the SDC/Compustat sample 
from which it is drawn (N=1,746) to assess whether there is a selection issue associated with the use 
of the Pratt’s database. The two samples are similar with respect to acquirer and combined wealth 
effects (ACAR & PCAR), but target shareholders gain more in our sample (TCAR; mean [median] 
0.265 [0.230]) than in the SDC sample (mean [median] 0.239 [0.193]). In terms of deal 
characteristics, our sample contains fewer stock only acquisitions than the SDC sample (19.5% vs. 
23.6%), but more tender offers (20.4% vs. 16.3%). Whereas these differences together suggest 
higher anticipated synergies in our sample, the average synergy gain is numerically, but not 
statistically higher in our sample (0.029 vs. 0.025). 
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With respect to merging firms’ characteristics, our sample firms share a similar size with the 
average SDC firm, but our targets have marginally lower book-to-market ratios (0.578 vs. 0.677). In 
addition, both our acquirers and targets have greater analyst following and are on average two years 
older than the firms in the SDC sample. Overall, these results reveal (economically) minor 
differences between the two samples, suggesting that our sample is representative of the deals in the 
SDC universe. Nevertheless, our analyses systematically control for these differences and other firm 
and transaction characteristics that are documented by prior research to affect deal outcomes.    
3.2 Empirical Model 
We conduct our empirical tests on the relation between merger wealth effects (DEPVAR) 
and purchase price allocations using the following model specification: 
DEPVAR = β1 + β2REL_GW + β3REL_RD + β4REL_TECH + β5REL_CLIENT+ 
β6REL_RIGHTS + β7REL_TM + β8REL_INTAN + β9CAPRD_ACQ + 
β10CAPADV_ACQ + β11INTAN_ACQ + β12CAPRD_TAR + β13CAPADV_TAR + 
β14INTAN_TAR + β15SIZE_ACQ + β16LDVALUE +β17STOCKONLY + β18MERGER + 
β19TENDER + β20BIDCOMP + β21DIVERSIFY + β22BTM_ACQ + β23BTM_TAR + 
β24ROA_ACQ + β25ROA_TAR + β26FIRMAGE_ACQ + β27FIRMAGE_TAR + 
β28RUNUP_ACQ + β29RUNUP_TAR + β30ANALYST_ACQ + β31ANALYST_TAR + 
β31PROBACQ + Year FE + Industry FE + ɛ           (3) 
 
Where DEPVAR captures different merger wealth effects related to (1) synergies [the 
combined firms’ announcement return (PCAR), a combined announcement return that is adjusted 
for anticipation, industry shocks, and signals of the acquirer’s standalone valuation (ADJ_PCAR), a 
combined announcement return adjusted via a withdrawn deal sample (WDADJ_PCAR), or the 
amount of dollar synergies relative to the deal value (REL_PCAR)], (2) acquirer value creation [the 
acquirer’s announcement return (ACAR), an acquirer announcement return that is adjusted for 
anticipation, industry shocks, and signals of the acquirer’s standalone valuation (ADJ_ACAR), an 
acquirer announcement return adjusted via a withdrawn deal sample (WDADJ_ACAR), or the 
amount of the acquirer’s dollar synergies relative to the deal value (REL_ACAR)], and (3) four 
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measures capturing wealth transferred from acquirer to target shareholders [an estimate of the 
premium paid (PREMIUM), an estimate of the distribution of gains to targets relative to acquirers 
(TGAIN), an alternative distribution measure adjusted for anticipation, industry shocks, and signals 
of the acquirer’s standalone valuation (ADJ_TGAIN), or a distribution measure adjusted via a 
withdrawn deal sample (WDADJ_TGAIN)]. The explanatory variables are defined in more detail in 
Appendix C. Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification and we 
use robust standard errors that are clustered at the acquirer level in our tests.  
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses based on all 447 
mergers in the full sample and for subsamples that contain either 304 related or 143 diversifying 
mergers. We discuss results for the full sample and refer to the subsamples when tests reveal 
noteworthy differences between related and diversifying deals.   
Table 2, Panel A reports several measures of merger wealth effects. In the full sample, the 
mean (median) acquirer wealth effect—ACAR—is negative -1.1% (-0.9%).  This is in line with prior 
research findings, in terms of both direction and magnitude. Moeller et al. (2004) and Ahern (2012) 
report negative acquirer returns for public acquisitions of -1.02% and -1.27%, respectively. A lower 
acquirer return of -2.14% within a five-day window is documented in Cai and Sevilir (2012, p. 334).    
The target wealth effect (TCAR) and estimated synergy gains (PCAR) are both positive, 
representing 26.5% (median: 23.0%) of the target’s market value and 2.9% (median: 1.8%) of the 
combined merger value. The target wealth effect is in line with the 19.8% reported by Ahern (2012, 
p. 537) and the 21.2% reported by Cai and Sevilir (2012, p. 334).  However, our estimated synergy 
gains are an order of magnitude greater than the 1.35% and 1.12% reported by Moeller et al. (2004, 
p. 224) and Cai and Sevilir (2012, p. 534), respectively. The premium paid for the target, calculated 
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relative to the target’s market value two months prior to deal announcement, averages approximately 
40%. TGAIN is the relative gain to the target firm and is calculated as the dollar gain of the target 
minus the dollar gain of the acquirer, divided by the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s market 
capitalization two months prior to deal announcement, following Ahern (2012). The average of 0.046 
indicates that for each dollar of combined pre-merger values, targets gain 4.6 cents more than 
acquirers do. Furthermore, the average target gain in related acquisitions is greater than in 
diversifying acquisitions (5.0 cents vs. 3.8 cents). 
In addition to the conventional measures of wealth effects, we find that acquirer shareholders 
gain 0.6% (and value creation averages 4.3%) when we disentangle acquirer’s revelation and adjust 
announcement returns for the likelihood that an acquisition is anticipated. Further, when adjusting 
announcement returns using a sample of exogenously withdrawn deals we find, similar to Wang 
(2018), that acquirers gain 3.7% and that synergy estimates average 6.7%. The final measure we 
consider is our adjusted wealth effect measure deflated by deal value. This is a way of assessing the 
expected yield to or ROI on the acquirer’s investment (REL_ACAR, 11.6%) and the value creation 
as a function of the size of the deal (REL_PCAR, 26.8%).   
Table 2, Panel B reports how the purchase price is allocated to goodwill, various types of 
previously unrecorded intangibles, and tangible net assets. The allocation to goodwill (REL_GW) is 
the largest, representing on average 43.9% of the purchase price, followed by that to tangible net 
assets as a group (REL_TANG; 28.0%). Intangible assets represent R&D (REL_RD; 3.3%), 
trademarks (REL_TM; 2.7%), customer relationships (REL_CLIENT; 6.0%), rights 
(REL_RIGHTS; 1.6%), technology (REL_TECH; 4.7%), and a group of unspecified intangibles that 
are typically disclosed as ‘other’ (REL_INTAN; 9.9%). When comparing related mergers with 
diversifying mergers, acquirers in related deals purchase more R&D (4.0% vs. 1.9%), rights (2.1% 
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vs. 0.5%), and tangible assets (31.0% vs. 21.6%) than acquirers in diversifying deals. On the other 
hand, diversifying acquirers purchase more customer relationships (6.7% vs. 5.7%) and goodwill 
(50.2% vs. 40.9%).   
Since some intangible assets are already recognized in the target’s balance sheet prior to the 
merger (potentially due to previous mergers) and market participants are likely to estimate 
unrecorded intangibles based on information from the financial statements, we include pre-merger 
intangible assets as control variables to strengthen our test of whether purchase price allocations 
provide incremental information to shareholders. Table 2, Panel C reports estimated unrecorded 
intangibles and recorded intangibles by the acquirer and the target before the merger.    
We estimate unrecorded R&D assets and trademarks by relying on capitalization techniques 
proposed in prior studies.10 We find that  63% and 67% of the sample acquirers and targets engaged 
in R&D activities prior to the merger, with the capitalized values representing 8.6% and 12.5% of 
the acquirer’s and target’s pre-merger assets (see the means of CAPRD_ACQ and CAPRD_TAR). 
The capitalized trademark values represent 0.5% and 0.6% of the acquirer’s and target’s pre-merger 
total assets (see the means of CAPADV_ACQ and CAPADV_TAR).  
Lastly, we incorporate existing intangible assets recognized in the acquirer’s and the target’s 
pre-merger balance sheet. On average, prior to the merger, 23.4% of the acquirer’s total assets and 
17.6% of the target’s total assets are recognized as intangible assets (see the means of INTAN_ACQ 
and INTAN_TAR). Acquirers and targets in diversifying acquisitions possess more existing 
recognized intangibles than acquirers and targets in related mergers. 
                                                          
10 Specifically, we calculate the capitalized value of R&D by combining historical R&D expenditures with the 
industry-specific capitalization coefficients from Lev and Sougiannis (1996). To estimate trademarks, following 
Penman and Zhang (2002), we capitalize advertising expenditures, assuming a two-year useful life and a straight-line 
amortization schedule. 
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To show that purchase price allocations provide incremental information about shareholders’ 
wealth, we include various deal characteristics and merging firms’ characteristics as control variables 
in our regression. Table 2, Panel D reports descriptive statistics on the most important deal 
characteristics. The median deal value is $574 million, the form of payment is exclusively stock in 
19.5% of the deals, there are few mergers of equals deals (1.6%), 20.4% of the deals are tender offers, 
3.1% of the deals have competing offers, and 32% of the deals are diversifying.11 The estimated pre-
merger probability of the acquirer being involved in a transaction is on average 8.5%. Only one 
difference obtains in the sample partition: there are fewer stock-only acquisitions in the diversifying 
merger sample (14.0%) as compared to the related merger sample (22.0%).  
Table 2, Panel E, reports descriptive statistics on various characteristics of both the acquirer 
and the target (book-to-market, profitability, age, stock price run-up, and analyst following). The 
average acquirer’s market capitalization is $2.4 billion prior to the merger (SIZE_ACQ). 
Diversifying acquirers and targets are more profitable (in terms of return on assets) than those in 
related mergers.   
Table 3 presents pairwise correlation coefficients.  Although the table has several noteworthy 
correlations, we do not discuss it thoroughly as we present it for reference. For example, the first five 
variables are predictably highly correlated as they represent alternative attributes of our wealth effect 
estimates. Consistent with prior work, stock-only acquisitions are associated with negative wealth 
effects and book-to-market ratios are related to a number of deal and firm characteristics.  
A few correlation coefficients are noteworthy. The correlation coefficient between 
CAPRD_ACQ and REL_RD is 0.36 and that between CAPADV_ACQ and REL_TM is 0.37, 
                                                          
11 There are only three deals in our sample that are classified as hostile, and as such, we do not report results controlling 
for hostile deals in the regressions. However, our inferences are unaffected if we include an indicator variable for 
whether the deal is hostile.   
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suggesting that acquirers who conduct R&D activities and internally develop trademarks are more 
likely to acquire firms who undertake similar activities. Similarly, the correlation coefficient between 
CAPRD_TAR and REL_RD is 0.48 and that between CAPADV_TAR and REL_TM is 0.36, 
suggesting that allocations to R&D and trademark intangibles are more likely to occur when targets 
conduct such activities. Because several cross-variable correlations have large magnitudes, we 
examine variance inflation factors and find no evidence that particular independent variables or 
groups of variables are inflating the variance of the parameter estimates.   
4. Empirical Results  
4.1 Merger Synergies 
Table 4, Panel A reports results from five specifications of the relation between merger 
synergies and purchase price allocations. In Models (1) and (2), the dependent variable is PCAR, a 
synergy estimate calculated following Bradley et al. (1988). In Model (3) the dependent variable is 
the combined announcement return adjusted for anticipation, industry shocks and signals on the 
acquirer’s standalone valuation (ADJ_PCAR), and in Model (4), it is the combined announcement 
return adjusted via a withdrawn deal sample (WDADJ_PCAR). In the final column (Model 5), the 
dependent variable is the amount of dollar synergies relative to the deal value (REL_PCAR).12  
Model (1) is a base model drawn from variables commonly used in prior work (e.g., Moeller 
et al. 2004, Ahern 2012, Cai and Sevilir 2012) to capture deal and firm characteristics: it includes 18 
explanatory variables plus year and industry fixed effects and its adjusted R2 is 23.6%. Three 
variables are noteworthy. In line with evidence from prior research (e.g., Travlos 1987; Moeller et 
al. 2004; Savor and Lu 2009) that using stock as a payment method potentially signals acquirer 
                                                          
12 We do not tabulate the estimation results for base models with the three alternative measurements of the dependent 
variable. These are similar and available on request. For comparison, we tabulate the base model adjusted R2 below 
each estimation.  
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overvaluation, the coefficient on STOCKONLY is significantly negative in four of the five models, 
the exception being in the estimation with REL_PCAR in Model 5. Acquirer size (SIZE_ACQ) is 
negatively associated with announcement returns (PCAR, ADJ_PCAR, and WDADJ_PCAR), 
consistent with evidence in Moeller et al. (2004). Deal value (LDVALUE) is positively related to 
combined announcement returns (PCAR, ADJ_PCAR, and WDADJ_PCAR), suggesting greater 
overall synergy creation in larger deals. However, in the regressions with REL_PCAR, deal value 
(acquirer size) is negatively (positively) associated with the announcement return, suggesting 
decreasing returns to scale as fewer synergies are created per dollar invested in larger deals.  
Model (2) is the base model augmented by the percentage of the purchase price allocated to 
goodwill and intangible assets, as well as proxies for pre-merger unreported intangibles. As 
discussed before, we leave out the allocation to tangible assets, which serves as a reference category 
in our estimation. The model has an adjusted R2 of 28.1%, representing an improvement in 
explanatory power over the base model of 19.1%. Three of the purchase price allocation variables 
are noteworthy. The coefficient on REL_RD, the percentage of the purchase price allocated to R&D 
intangibles, is positive and marginally significant (0.057, t-statistic=1.70). The coefficient on 
REL_TECH, the portion of the purchase price allocated to technology intangibles, is also 
significantly positive (0.093, t-statistic=2.39). These results indicate that purchasing R&D and 
technology generates more synergies than purchasing net tangible assets. These results are also 
economically significant: Evaluated at the sample mean, synergies related to R&D and technology 
intangibles equal 0.19% and 0.44% respectively, which combined represents 21.7% of the sample-
average merger synergy estimate of 2.90%.  
In contrast, the coefficient on REL_CLIENT, the percentage of the purchase price allocated 
to customer relationships, is reliably negative (-0.132, t-statistic= -3.24). This suggests that the 
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purchase of customer relationships, such as client lists and customer contracts, creates less value, for 
example because the newly acquired customers have the potential to destroy value from the 
acquirer’s existing customer base.13  
The variable CAPRD_ACQ, our proxy for the acquirer’s involvement in R&D activities, is 
negatively related to synergies (-0.168, t-statistic= -3.10), suggesting either higher risk or greater 
investor uncertainty about the synergistic value of acquisitions by R&D intensive acquirers. The 
variable INTAN_TAR, capturing pre-merger reported intangibles at the target, is positively related 
to synergies (0.041, t-statistic=2.15), suggesting either lower risk or lower investor uncertainty about 
the synergistic value of acquisitions when the target had existing, recognizable, intangible assets 
prior to the merger.  
We find similar results using our alternative measures of synergies. For example, in Model 
(3) the coefficients on REL_RD and REL_TECH are positive and equal to 0.066 (t-statistic=1.92) 
and 0.109 (t-statistic=2.67), respectively, and similarly, in Model (4) the coefficients on REL_RD 
and REL_TECH equal 0.065 (t-statistic=1.92) and 0.096 (t-statistic=2.46), respectively. Finally, 
Model (5) also reveals higher synergies associated with R&D and technology intangibles. In 
particular, the coefficients on REL_RD and REL_TECH are reliably positive and equal to 0.902 (t-
statistic=3.51) and 0.854 (t-statistic=3.12), respectively. Evaluated at the sample mean, synergies 
related to R&D equal 2.98% and those related to technology equal 4.01% of deal value, suggesting 
that in total, innovation-related synergies account for approximately 26.3% of the sample merger 
synergies. In sum, we generally find greater (smaller) synergies in acquisitions involving R&D and 
                                                          
13 Revenue synergies, presumably driven by acquired customer-related intangibles, tend to be harder to achieve than 
cost synergies, because integrating sales teams from two merging companies, preventing client cannibalization, and 
creating incremental sales are often more challenging tasks than cutting cost  (e.g., Houston, et al. 2001;  Cullinan, et 
al. 2004, Devos, et al. 2009; E&Y 2013, Chartier, et al. 2017). Our results suggest that market participants seem to 
recognize this potential for value-destruction and discount the benefits of purchasing customer-related intangibles. 
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technology (clients) and document that our alternative estimation, which includes information on 
allocations, explains 23.5%, 38.3%, and 30.6% of the variation in deal synergies. This represents an 
improvement in explanatory power over the corresponding base models of 12.6%, 10.4%, and 
10.1%. 
In Table 4, Panel B, we partition the sample into diversifying and related mergers and include 
all explanatory variables from Equation (3). The results generally suggest that the findings on the 
full sample in Panel A are driven by the subsample of 304 related (non-diversifying) acquisitions. 
The coefficients on REL_RD and REL_TECH are positive and significant in all of the regressions. 
In addition, we find that the percentage of the purchase price allocated to trademark-related 
intangibles is also significantly associated with deal synergies. For example, in Model (2), with 
PCAR as the measure of value creation, REL_TM is reliably positive (0.109, t-statistic=2.09). The 
variable CAPADV_TAR, our proxy for the target’s involvement in advertising activities, is 
negatively related to synergies, and CAPRD_ACQ, our proxy for the acquirer’s involvement in R&D 
activities, is also negatively correlated with synergies.  
In sum, we find that the purchase price allocated to R&D, technology, and trademarks 
explains a significant portion of the sample estimated merger synergies, especially in related deals. 
Broadly, our findings suggest that synergies stem from a target’s intellectual property rather than 
simply arising from patented innovation. 
4.2 Acquirer Wealth Effects 
Table 5, Panel A reports the results of five specifications of the relation between acquirer 
wealth effects and purchase price allocations. In Models (1) and (2), the dependent variable is 
ACAR, the conventional three-day abnormal return on the stock of the acquirer. In Model (3) the 
dependent variable is ACAR adjusted for anticipation, industry shocks, and revelations about the 
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acquirer’s standalone valuation (ADJ_ACAR). In Model (4) the dependent variable is ACAR 
adjusted via a withdrawn deal sample (WDADJ_ACAR), and in the final column (Model 5), the 
dependent variable is the dollar wealth effect relative to the deal value (REL_ACAR). Relative to 
their respective base models (shown in column 1 for ACAR), the models augmented with data on 
allocations have an adjusted R2 that is equal to 20.4%, 16.5%, 40.9%, and 24.7%. This represents an 
improvement in explanatory power over their respective base models of 17.9%, 22.2%, 5.7%, and 
9.8%, respectively. 
The principal finding in these estimations is the negative relation between acquirer wealth 
and the percentage of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. The coefficient on REL_GW is equal 
to -0.049 (t-statistic=-2.68), -0.050 (t-statistic=-2.60), -0.039 (t-statistic=-2.16), and -0.224 (t-
statistic=-1.90), in Models (2) through (5), respectively. This is consistent with acquirers overpaying 
for goodwill and investors being uncertain about the suitability of the price paid for the investment 
in the target. This effect is also economically consequential: evaluated at the sample mean, the wealth 
loss associated with goodwill ranges from -1.7% to -2.2% of the acquirer’s pre-merger market value 
(in Models (2), (3) and (4)), and implies a negative yield of -9.8% of deal value in Model (5). On the 
other hand, there is evidence in Model (5) that the acquirer wealth effect increases with the purchase 
price allocated to R&D and technology: The coefficients on REL_RD and REL_TECH are reliably 
positive and equal to 0.667 (t-statistic=2.59) and 0.692 (t-statistic=2.56), respectively. Evaluated at 
the sample mean, the wealth gain associated with these assets is 2.2% for R&D and 3.4% for acquired 
technology. The variable CAPRD_ACQ, our proxy for the acquirer’s involvement in R&D 
activities, and STOCKONLY are negatively related to the acquirer’s wealth, consistent with our 
previous findings in the synergy analysis (Table 4).  
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In Table 5, Panel B, we report results for related and diversifying deals. Consistent with our 
synergy findings, the acquirer findings on the full sample in Panel A are driven by the subsample of 
304 non-diversifying acquisitions. The coefficient on REL_GW is negative in all estimations, and 
the coefficients on REL_RD and REL_TECH are positive in the REL_ACAR estimation.  
The novel result in the sample partition is that, consistent with results in Table 4 Panel B, 
acquirer wealth increases with the proportion of the purchase price that is allocated to trademarks 
(REL_TM). Trademarks, a word, phrase, symbol, or design that identifies the source of good of one 
party from the others (i.e., brands), seem to create value in related rather than in diversifying 
acquisitions. This finding may be explained by the difficulty for customers to recognize brands 
across different product markets. Indeed, analyzing three-day abnormal returns around the 
announcements of 136 brand acquisitions, Fine et al. (2016) show that brand acquisitions increase 
acquirer wealth only in related mergers and suggest that is because information asymmetry is 
pervasive in diversifying mergers. Moreover, several studies suggest that rebranding activities are 
more likely to occur when acquirers and targets share a similar product market because customers 
perceive the combination of two brands in a similar market as a logical fit and reorganizing two sales 
forces that share similar operations is easier to achieve (e.g., see Capron and Hulland 1999, Lambkin 
Muzellec 2008, Gussoni and Mangani 2012). 
Overall, we find that the purchase price allocated to goodwill and trademarks explain a 
significant portion of the acquirer’s wealth effects, especially in related deals. In addition, there is 
some, albeit weaker, evidence of greater acquirer value creation in deals with allocations to R&D 
and technology, which contrasts to their much stronger relation with estimated synergies. 
Specifically, our results suggest that allocations to goodwill explain the majority of acquirer losses, 
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while acquisitions of trademarks (in related deals only) and to some extent R&D and technology, 
explain the majority of acquirer’s gains.  
4.3 Takeover Premium and Distribution of Gains 
Table 6, Panel A reports estimation results for the takeover premium (PREMIUM, Models 1 
and 2) and the target’s relative gain in the merger (TGAIN, ADJ_TGAIN, and WDADJ_TGAIN, 
Models 3 to 6). Models 1 and 3 (2 and 4), present base (augmented) models with deal and firm 
characteristics as well as year and industry fixed effects. Adding variables capturing the purchase 
price allocation as well as the existence of pre-merger intangible assets increases the adjusted R2 
from 23.8% to 27.5% in Models (1) and (2) and from 28.3% to 31.0% in Models (3) and (4).  
In Model (2), we find that the takeover premium increases with the fraction of the purchase 
price allocated to goodwill and to various types of intangible assets. In particular, the coefficients on 
REL_GW, REL_RD, REL_TECH, REL_RIGHTS, and REL_INTAN are reliably positive and 
equal to 0.268 (t-statistic=2.98), 0.435 (t-statistic=2.07), 0.511 (t-statistic=2.86), 0.500 (t-
statistic=2.27), and 0.370 (t-statistic=2.45), respectively. Evaluated at the sample mean, the premium 
related to goodwill represents 11.7% (30% of the sample average premium), the premium portion 
related to R&D equals 1.4%, and that related to technology, rights, and other intangibles equals 
2.4%, 0.8%, and 3.7%, respectively. This suggests that the purchase price allocation explains almost 
half of the sample takeover premium and that a substantial portion of the premium arises from the 
acquisition of various intangible assets.   
In the estimation of the target’s relative gain in Models (4) to (6), the main determinant is the 
percentage of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. The coefficient on REL_GW equals 0.062 
(t-statistic=4.05), 0.063 (t-statistic=3.88), and 0.056 (t-statistic=3.69) in Models (4) to (6), 
respectively. This effect is economically significant.  For example, when the Model (4) estimate is 
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evaluated at the sample mean, the effect accounts for 2.7 cents or over half of the sample average of 
4.6 cents per dollar of combined pre-merger value that targets gain incrementally to acquirers. 
Coupled with the negative relation between goodwill allocations and acquirer CARs, this result 
suggests that acquirers overpay for goodwill. The models augmented with information on purchase 
price allocations and pre-merger intangible assets have an adjusted R2 that is equal to 31.0% and 
30.0% and 50%, respectively suggesting improvements of 9.5%, 8.3%, and 3.3% over the 
corresponding base models. 
Taken together, our results suggest that targets earn a higher premium when acquirers buy 
goodwill or other intangible assets. The positive relation between premium and intangibles such as 
R&D and technology is likely driven by the synergies that these intangible assets create (consistent 
with results in Table 4), while the positive relation between the premium paid and goodwill 
allocations is likely driven by overpayment on part of the acquirer, as indicated by a higher relative 
gain earned by the target and a lower acquirer announcement return (Tables 5 and 6).   
These conjectures are consistent with the evidence we present in Table 6, Panel B. When we 
partition the sample into diversifying and related mergers, we expect greater synergies in related 
mergers than diversifying mergers, but that overpayment is present in both related and diversifying 
mergers. Consistent with this view, we find that the fraction of the purchase price allocated to 
goodwill is positively related to both the premium and the target’s relative gain across all Models 
(1)-(8), while allocations to technology and other intangibles explain the premium only in related 
mergers (see REL_TECH and REL_INTAN in Model (2)). Interestingly, despite the synergies that 
we document for trademarks in related deals, we do not find that the premium is greater in deals in 
which acquirers buy trademarks. Coupled with the previous results, the negative relation between 
the target’s relative gain and the allocation to trademarks suggests that unlike synergies arising from 
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most (intangible) assets, which flow to the target, acquirers reap most of the synergies that arise from 
trademarks.  
4.4 Robustness Tests 
4.4.1 Market reaction to the subsequent SEC Filing that contains the PPA disclosure 
We identify exact PPA disclosure dates for 427 out of 447 sample deals.  The average number 
of days between the deal announcement and the PPA disclosure date (usually the first 10-K or 10-Q 
filing after deal completion) is 221 days (see the timeline in Appendix D). The 25th, 50th, and 75th 
percentiles are 158, 207, and 267 days, respectively. Our earlier results show that investors’ 
recognized synergies at deal announcements are consistent with purchase price allocations disclosed 
on average 221 days later, suggesting that some form of (voluntary) disclosure regarding the nature 
of synergies or the assets acquired is available to investors at the time mergers are first announced. 
These voluntary disclosures, although not audited, are reliable because investors can reconcile the 
information released on initial deal announcement dates with ex-post audited purchase price 
allocations disclosed in SEC filings. This confirmation hypothesis follows Ball et al. (2012), who 
argue that forward-looking financial information released in voluntary disclosures is likely to be 
truthful if the information will later be verified by independent auditors.  
 To evaluate whether investors have sufficient information to value deal synergies at deal 
announcements, we investigate the extent to which there is a market reaction to the subsequent 10-
Q/10-K in which the PPA is disclosed. In Table 7, Panel A we report our estimate of the three-day 
(-1,+1) abnormal (size-adjusted) market reaction to the first 10-Q or 10-K that contains PPA 
disclosures. When we use all observations, we find that average 10-Q/10-K announcement returns 
are significantly negative with a mean (median) of -0.64% (-0.46%). This is in contrast to Shalev 
(2009) who finds no market reaction to PPA disclosures, but in line with Paugam et al. (2015) who 
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report an average reaction of -0.60%. However, after dropping 10-Q/10-K filings that are concurrent 
with earnings announcements (defined as 10-Qs/10-Ks with an earnings announcement during the 
one- or two-day window prior to the 10-Q/10K), we find that announcement returns are no longer 
significantly different from zero (mean -0.21%), suggesting that the information content in the 10-
Q/10-K is mostly driven by earnings news, rather than information in the PPA disclosure.14  
These results are further confirmed by the evidence we report in Table 7, Panel B. In these 
tests, instead of investigating signed announcement returns, we measure the abnormal variance 
around the 10-Q or 10-K. Many studies investigating the informativeness of earnings announcement 
use similar types of measures to infer the extent to which relevant information is released on these 
days (e.g., Collins et al. 2009; Landsman et al. 2012). Specifically, we compare the average absolute 
return in the three-day 10-Q/10-K announcement window to the average absolute return during the 
50 trading days prior to the announcement of the 10-Q or 10-K (-51,-2). If there is an earnings 
announcement during this 50-day period we drop the three days (-1,+1) surrounding the earnings 
announcement for the calculation of benchmark absolute returns. Results are comparable to those 
reported in Panel A. When we include all observations with available data, there is considerable 
evidence of information content in 10-Qs/10-Ks, however, after dropping observations with 
concurrent earnings announcements there is only limited evidence of information content in the 10-
Q/10-K that contains the PPA.  
In Table 7, Panel C we report the results of tests in which we investigate the relation between 
deal announcement CARs and the return around the disclosure of the 10-Q/10-K that contains the 
PPA. Specifically, we run a regression of deal announcement returns on the return around the 10-
                                                          
14 In additional tests we find that the change in earnings is a strong predictor of 10-Q or 10-K announcement returns 
in filings with a concurrent earnings announcement, confirming that it is mainly earnings news in concurrent earnings 
announcements that drives the significantly negative CAR around the 10-Q or 10-K filing.  
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K/10-Q that contains the PPA disclosure. After dropping contaminated 10-Q/10-K disclosures, we 
only find a modest positive and significant relation between acquirer (target) announcement CARs 
and the return around the 10-Q/10-K in the specification that drops contaminated announcements in 
the [-1,0] ([-2,0]) window. We do not find a significant relation between estimated synergies (as 
reflected by PCAR) and the 10-Q/10-K announcement return.  
Finally, in Table 7, Panel D, we re-estimate our main regressions by replacing the deal 
announcement CAR with the return around the 10-Q/10-K that contains the PPA. Unlike the main 
results reported in Table 4 in which we show that purchase price allocations are a significant 
predictor of deal synergies, we do not find that purchase price allocations are significantly related to 
the 10-Q/10-K announcement return. Overall, the tests reported in Table 7, Panels A-D suggest that 
there is only limited information content in the subsequent disclosure of the PPA.  
4.4.2 PPA Reporting Bias 
Several studies use purchase price allocations (PPA) to explore slightly different research 
questions. Kimbrough (2007) shows that a target’s pre-merger stock price is positively correlated 
with the proportion of the purchase price that is allocated to R&D, suggesting that investors may 
possess private information about R&D activities that are not allowed to be recognized on the target’s 
financial statements. Shalev (2009), Shalev et al. (2013), and Zhang and Zhang (2017) examine 
managers’ discretion over the content of PPA disclosures and, for example, show that CEO 
incentives to meet earnings benchmarks are positively associated with reporting biases in the PPA.  
To assess the robustness of our findings, we incorporate the proxy for reporting bias 
incentives commonly used in these studies. In particular, Shalev et al. (2013) argue that a CEO’s 
cash bonus likely captures their incentives to meet earnings-based benchmarks and they find that the 
size of an acquirer CEO’s bonus is positively associated with the proportion of the purchase price 
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that is allocated to goodwill. Consequently, we collect acquirer’s CEO compensation details from 
ExecuComp and pre-merger proxy statements and add a variable that captures a CEO’s cash bonus 
deflated by total compensation over the two years prior to the merger in all our analyses. The average 
bonus percentage in our sample is equal to 7.4 percent of total compensation, with the majority of 
the acquirers not paying a bonus to their CEO (the median bonus is zero). We find quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar results (untabulated), suggesting that our findings are not an artifact of biased 
reporting of purchase price allocations.  
5. Conclusion 
Our paper shows that purchase price allocation disclosures can help researchers identify 
sources of synergies in mergers and incrementally explain variation in combined and acquirer wealth 
effects, target premia, and the division of synergy gains. Results based on a sample of 447 mergers 
involving publicly traded bidders and targets from 2001 to 2015 show that greater proportions of 
purchased technology, R&D, and trademarks are positively associated with deal synergies. Our 
evidence suggests that target firms’ intellectual property substantially impacts value creation in 
mergers and extends prior work on merger synergies as intellectual property encompasses not only 
patents and on-going R&D activities, but also a variety of unpatented technologies, trade secrets, 
internally developed software, and trademarks. On the other hand, whereas goodwill can be 
construed as the present value of unspecified synergies expected by management, we find that any 
such synergies are no different from the synergies associated with acquired tangible assets. Indeed, 
we show that acquirers overpay for goodwill resulting in a wealth transfer from acquirer to target 
shareholders.  
We show that these results obtain using alternative measures of deal synergies and acquirer 
wealth effects. Specifically, in addition to presenting results employing conventionally measured 
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acquirer and combined announcement returns, we also present our results using three easy-to-
implement alternative measures of announcement wealth effects that (1) adjust for anticipation, 
industry shocks, and revelations about the acquirer’s standalone valuation, (2) adjust via a withdrawn 
deal sample, or (3) express the synergies and acquirer wealth effect relative to the amount invested 
in the deal to create a ROI-type measure.   
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Appendix A: Details on the information and asset classes in the PPA disclosure 
 
Since the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141 in 2001, firms 
have been required to allocate purchase prices to separately identified intangible assets, in addition 
to tangible assets and goodwill. We argue that the additional disclosure requirement of separately 
identifying intangible assets can provide investors with richer information about sources and 
values of merger synergies. Specifically, consistent with the requirements of SFAS 141we separate 
a firm’s allocation to intangible assets into the following categories: R&D, Technology, Clients, 
Rights, Trademarks, Goodwill, and other intangibles (“Other”).  A short description of each of 
these asset categories is as follows: 
- R&D: Incomplete research and development projects that have not reached technological 
feasibility upon the completion of acquisition. Technological feasibility implies that all 
necessary planning, designing, coding and testing activities are completed in order to 
establish commercial products (e.g., software systems or FDA approved drugs).    
- Technologies: Includes developed R&D, patents, trade secrets, internally developed 
software or IT processes, databases, and unpatented technologies. The Uniform Trade Secret 
Act defines a trade secret as information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) 
is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
- Client relationships: Relationships and contract agreements with a target’s existing 
customers, including order backlogs, existing contracts (e.g., mobile phone subscriptions), 
and anticipated future contracts as well as customer lists. 
- Rights: Contract-based intangibles such as licensing, franchising, and lease agreements as 
well as use rights for drilling, water, air, etc.   
- Trademarks: Words, phrases, symbols, and/or designs that identify the source of good of 
one party from the others (i.e., brands). 
- Goodwill: The residual amount of the purchase price that cannot be allocated to any 
identifiable assets and is not separately identifiable. Firms often describe goodwill as other 
sources of synergies, such as assembled workforce or cost savings from removing 
redundancies. 
On the next page, we show and shortly discuss two examples of purchase price allocations. 
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Purchase Price Allocation Disclosures regarding Oracle’s Acquisitions of BEA Systems and 
Sun Microsystems  
BEA Systems: 
Pursuant to our business combinations accounting policy, the total purchase price for BEA was allocated to the net 
tangible assets, intangible assets, and in-process research and development based upon their estimated fair values as 
of April 29, 2008 as set forth below. The excess of the purchase price over the net tangible assets, intangible assets, 
and in-process research and development acquired was recorded as goodwill: 
         
(in millions)       
  
    
Cash and marketable securities  $ 1,775  
Trade receivables    167  
Goodwill    4,355  
Intangible assets    3,343  
Other assets    248  
Accounts payable and other liabilities    (386 ) 
Restructuring (see Note 7)    (231 ) 
Deferred tax liabilities, net    (551 ) 
Deferred revenues    (164 ) 
In-process research and development (IPR&D)    17  
         
Total purchase price  $ 8,573  
          
 
In accordance with SFAS 141, Oracle is also required to decompose the $3,343 it allocates to 
intangible assets:  
In performing our preliminary purchase price allocation, we considered, among other factors, our intention 
for future use of acquired assets, analyses of historical financial performance and estimates of future 
performance of BEA’s products. The fair values of intangible assets were calculated using an income approach 
and estimates and assumptions provided by both BEA and Oracle management. The rates utilized to discount 
net cash flows to their present values were based on our weighted average cost of capital and ranged from 7% to 17%. 
This discount rate was determined after consideration of our rate of return on debt capital and equity and the weighted 
average return on invested capital. The following table sets forth the preliminary components of intangible assets 
associated with the BEA acquisition: 
             
(Dollars in millions)   Fair Value   Useful Life 
  
      
Software support agreements and related relationships  $ 1,115   8 years 
Developed technology   1,118   6 years 
Core technology   518   7 years 
Customer relationships   530   8 years 
Trademarks and other   62   5 years 
             
Total intangible assets  $   3,343     
              
 
Where they continue to describe what is included in each of these categories: 
Customer relationships and software support agreements and related relationships represent the underlying 
relationships and agreements with BEA’s customers. Developed technology is comprised of products that have 
reached technological feasibility and are a part of BEA’s product lines. Core technology represents a 
combination of BEA processes, patents and trade secrets related to the design and development of BEA’s 
software products. This proprietary know-how can be leveraged to develop new technology and improve our 
existing software products. Trademarks represent the fair value of brand and name recognition associated with 
the marketing of BEA’s products and services. 
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Following the methodology of our study, we would calculate the allocation to R&D to be 0.20% 
(17/8,573), the allocation to technology to be 32.09% (2,751/8,573), the allocation to clients to be 
6.18% (530/8,573), the allocation to trademarks to be 0.72% (62/8,573), and the allocation to 
Goodwill to be 50.80% (4,355/8,573).  
 
Sun Microsystems:   
Pursuant to our business combinations accounting policy, the total purchase price for Sun was allocated to the 
preliminary net tangible and intangible assets based upon their preliminary fair values as of January 26, 2010 as set 
forth below. The excess of the purchase price over the preliminary net tangible assets and intangible assets was 
recorded as goodwill: 
(in millions)        
Cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities    $    2,571   
Trade receivables      1,120   
Inventories      331   
Goodwill      1,291   
Intangible assets      3,347   
In-process research and development      415   
Other assets      2,035   
Deferred tax assets, net      1,250   
Accounts payable and other liabilities      (3,950 )  
Deferred revenues      (1,115 )            
Total preliminary purchase price    $ 7,295             
 
The following table sets forth the components of intangible assets acquired in connection with the Sun acquisition: 
 
(Dollars in millions)    Fair Value    Useful Life 
Hardware systems support agreements and related relationships    $ 771   7 years 
Developed technology                1,349   4 years 
Core technology      534   4 years 
Customer relationships      467   3 years 
Trademarks      226   7 years             
Total intangible assets subject to amortization      3,347    
In-process research and development      415   N.A.             
Total intangible assets    $ 3,762                
Hardware systems support agreements and related relationships and customer relationships represent the fair 
values of the underlying relationships and agreements with Sun’s customers. Developed technology represents 
the fair values of Sun products that have reached technological feasibility and are a part of Sun’s product lines. 
Core technology represents the fair values of the Sun processes, patents and trade secrets related to the design 
and development of Sun’s products. This proprietary know-how can be leveraged to develop new technology 
and improve our existing products. Trademarks represent the fair values of brand and name recognition 
associated with the marketing of Sun’s products and services. In-process research and development represents 
the fair values of incomplete Sun research and development projects that had not reached technological 
feasibility as of the date of acquisition. 
 
Following the methodology of our study, we would calculate the allocation to R&D to be 5.69% 
(415/7,295), the allocation to technology to be 25.81% (1,883/7,295), the allocation to clients to 
be 6.40% (467/7,295), the allocation to trademarks to be 3.10% (226/7,295), the allocation to 
rights to be 10.57% (771/7,295), and the allocation to Goodwill to be 17.70% (1,291/8,573).  
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Appendix B: Alternative Estimates of Acquirer Wealth Effects 
We build on prior work to provide an alternative estimate of the effect of merger 
announcements on acquirer shareholders’ wealth. Specifically, we adjust the stock price reaction 
for (i) industry shocks that often underlie merger activity (e.g., see Kaplan 2000; Andrade et al. 
2001), (ii) the partial anticipation of merger announcements by investors (e.g., Schipper and 
Thompson 1983; Song and Walking 2000; Wang 2018), and (iii) the extent to which a merger 
announcement reveals new information about the acquirer’s standalone valuation, such as 
incentives to engage in acquisitions in response to overvaluation and an acquirer’s limited growth 
opportunities (e.g., Travlos 1987; Fuller et al. 2002; McCardle and Viswanathan 1994; Moeller et 
al. 2004; Savor and Lu 2009). 
We begin by calculating abnormal returns adjusted for market and industry effects (IACAR). 
We estimate a bivariate market model that includes both the market return and a value-weighted 
Fama and French 12 industry return, over the one-year period ending two months prior to the deal 
announcement.15 Although the above abnormal return adjusts for both market and industry 
dynamics, we conjecture it still reflects both a signal of a firm’s overvaluation and (limited) growth 
opportunities and the net acquirer gain arising from previously unanticipated merger synergies. To 
separate the firm-specific signal from the merger gains, we estimate the following model using all 
public deals on SDC over the ten calendar years preceding the year in which a deal is announced: 
IACARit= a0 + a1STOCKONLYit + a2 TOBINSQit + a3SGROWTHit + a4CASHit + ɛit                                       (1) 
Where STOCKONLY refers to acquisitions with stock as the only mode of payment, TOBINSQ is 
measured as the sum of an acquirer’s market value of equity, preferred stock, and total debt, scaled 
by total assets in the year prior to the deal, SGROWTH is the natural logarithm of the change in sales 
over the year preceding the year in which the deal is announced, and CASH is the acquirer’s cash 
balance relative to total assets in the year prior to the deal. We include STOCKONLY as the 
exclusive use of stock as a mode of payment can signal to shareholders that the firm’s shares are 
overvalued. We include TOBINSQ and SGROWTH as two measures of (declining) growth 
opportunities for which the announcement of a deal can provide investors with new information that 
helps them to interpret an acquirer’s standalone future prospects. Finally, CASH is included as a 
high cash balance in conjunction with acquisitions can be informative about agency costs. We 
estimate this model over all public deals in SDC on a rolling window of ten calendar years preceding 
the year in which a deal is announced and we use the parameter estimates to predict the one-year 
ahead signal component present in IACAR. The difference between the actual stock price reaction 
and the predicted value (RES) is our estimate of the unanticipated merger wealth effect on the 
acquirer of deal j at time t+1:  
RESjt+1= IACARjt+1 – (ậ0 + ậ1STOCKONLYit + ậ2TOBINSQit + ậ3SGROWTHit + ậ4CASHit)         (2) 
                                                          
15 We find quantitatively similar results using two-digit historical SIC codes to calculate industry returns.  
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As a final step, we obtain our new estimate of merger wealth effects by dividing RESjt+1 by (1-PjACQ), 
where PjACQ is the estimated probability that firm j is an acquirer in year t+1 (detailed below):  
ADJ_ACARjt+1= RESjt+1 / (1- PjACQ)                                       (3) 
To the extent that a transaction is anticipated, there should be no or a smaller reaction at the time of 
the announcement of the deal. Building on prior literature (e.g. Cremers, Nair, and John 2008; 
Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang 2012), we estimate the following model on all firms with available 
data on Compustat and CRSP to obtain the probability of acquisition: 
ACQt+1 = a0 + a1NUMACQ_YEARit + a2NUMACQ_INDit + a3FIRM_ACQit + a4FIRM_NOACQit 
+ a5MVEit + a6LEVit + a7TOBINSQit + a8CASHit + a9SGROWTHit + a10ROAit + a11DIVIDENDit + 
a12GDWLit+ a13FIRMAGEit + a14R&Dit + a15SEGMENTSit + a16RETit + a17STDRETit + a18HERFit 
+ a19TRAOWNit + a20DEDOWNit + a21QIXOWNit + a22ANALYSTit + ɛit                                                               (4) 
Where ACQ is an indicator variable for whether a firm is an acquirer in year t+1. 
NUMACQ_YEAR is the natural logarithm of the number of deals in year t, NUMACQ_IND is the 
natural logarithm of the number of deals in the industry in year t, FIRM_ACQ is an indicator variable 
that is equal to one if the firm was an acquirer in year t, FIRM_NOACQ is an indicator variable that 
is equal to one if the firm did not engage in a transaction over the years t-3 to t-1, MVE is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity, LEV is the firm’s leverage, TOBINSQ, CASH, and 
SGROWTH are as defined before, ROA is the firm’s return on assets, DIVIDEND is an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if the firm pays a dividend, GDWL is the firm’s goodwill balance relative 
to total assets, FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s first 
appearance in CRSP, R&D is the firm’s R&D to sales ratio, SEGMENTS is the natural logarithm of 
the number of segments, RET is the firm’s market-adjusted return over the fiscal year, STDRET is 
the standard deviation of daily residual returns, HERF is the sales-based Herfindahl index of the 
industry, TRAOWN, DEDOWN, and QIXOWN, are the percentage of shares owned by transient, 
dedicated, and index-following institutional owners, and ANALYST is the natural logarithm of the 
number of analysts issuing an earnings forecast during year t. The Pseudo R2 of the model is 11.1% 
and the predicted probability of a deal is equal to 7.5% in cases in which there is an acquisition in 
year t+1 versus 3% in cases in which there is no acquisition in year t+1. Overall these results suggest 
that the model performs reasonably well in predicting future acquirers.   
An estimate of acquirer wealth effects based on Wang (2018) 
We draw from work by Savor and Lu (2009) and Wang (2018) who show that samples of 
withdrawn deals are useful in distinguishing between alternative explanations of the impact of 
mergers, and in estimating synergy gains by reference to synergy losses arising from exogenously 
failed deals. We identify 161 exogenously withdrawn deals (e.g., deals withdrawn due to regulatory 
intervention, litigation, and competing offers) over our sample period. Whereas Wang (2018) 
estimates the average acquirer wealth effect by subtracting from the conventional three-day average 
abnormal price reaction, the average abnormal return over a window starting one day after deal 
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announcement and ending one deal after the withdrawal date (ANN+1_WITHDRAWN+1), we are 
interested in wealth effect estimates at the individual acquirer level for use in our subsequent cross-
sectional tests. Because exogenously withdrawn deals are scarce, it is impossible to satisfactorily 
match withdrawn and completed deals in our sample. As such, we calculate an adjusted three-day 
price reaction by subtracting from the three-day ACAR, the mean estimated synergy losses in 
withdrawn deals in the same Fama-French-12 industry: 
WDADJ_ACARjt+1 = ACARjt+1 - FF12_Mean_(ANN+1 _WITHDRAWN+1)                                      (4) 
Despite the coarseness of the adjustment, when we require five or more withdrawn deals 
in each Fama-French 12 industry to compute a mean ANN+1_WITHDRAWN+1 return over the 
whole sample period, we lose five of the 12 industry groups, which however only represent a 
minority of the deals in our sample.  
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Appendix C: Variable Definitions 
Wealth Effects Variables 
ACAR 
 
The acquirer’s three-day cumulative abnormal return around the deal announcement (-1, +1). 
The CAPM model is used to calculate expected returns. Benchmark model parameters are 
estimated using daily returns over the one-year period ending two months prior to deal 
announcement. 
TCAR 
 
The target’s three-day cumulative abnormal return around the deal announcement (-1, +1). The 
CAPM model is used to calculate expected returns. Benchmark model parameters are estimated 
using daily returns over the one-year period ending two months prior to deal announcement. 
PCAR  The three-day cumulative abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the 
target. Weights are based on the market capitalization of the acquirer and the target two months 
prior to deal announcement. The percentage of the target owned by the acquirer prior to the 
merger (toehold) is deducted from the target’s weight. 
ADJ_ACAR The acquirer’s three-day cumulative abnormal return around the deal announcement (-1,+1), 
adjusted for industry shocks, partial anticipation, and signals about the acquirer’s standalone 
valuation, calculated following the procedure described in Appendix B.  
ADJ_PCAR The three-day cumulative abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the 
target, using ADJ_ACAR calculated following the procedure described in Appendix A as a 
proxy for the acquirer’s return. Weights are based on the market capitalization of the acquirer 
and the target two months prior to deal announcement. The percentage of the target owned by 
the acquirer prior to the merger (toehold) is deducted from the target’s weight. 
WDADJ_ACAR The acquirer’s three-day cumulative abnormal return around the deal announcement (-1,+1), 
adjusted for the industry-average withdrawn deal return, calculated over the period starting one 
day after deal announcement to one day after deal withdrawal, on a sample of 166 exogenously 
withdrawn deals, following the procedure described in Appendix B.  
WDADJ_PCAR The three-day cumulative abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the 
target, using WDADJ_ACAR as described in appendix A as a proxy for the acquirer’s return. 
Weights are based on the market capitalization of the acquirer and the target two months prior to 
deal announcement. The percentage of the target owned by the acquirer prior to the merger 
(toehold) is deducted from the target’s weight. 
REL_ACAR 
 
The dollar price movement of the acquirer is the market capitalization of the acquirer two 
months prior to the deal announcement times the acquirer’s adjusted three-day cumulative 
abnormal return around deal announcement (ADJ_ACAR) divided by the deal value (i.e., 
[(market cap target * ADJ_ACAR) / deal value]. ADJ_ACAR is calculated following the 
procedure described in Appendix B. 
REL_PCAR 
 
The dollar price movement on a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target is 
calculated as [(market cap acquirer * ADJ_ACAR) + (market cap target * TCAR) / deal value]. 
Market capitalization of the acquirer and the target are measured two months prior to deal 
announcement. The target’s market capitalization is adjusted for the percentage of the target 
owned by the acquirer prior to the merger (toehold). ADJ_ACAR is calculated following the 
procedure described in Appendix B. 
PREMIUM Premium is the initial offer price, or the final offer price if the initial offer price is missing, 
divided by the target’s stock price two months prior to deal announcement, minus one (i.e., 
[(offer price / pre-merger price) -1]. We set premium to missing if it is greater than two. 
REL_TGAIN 
 
The relative gain to the target firm is the dollar gain of the target (i.e., market cap target * 
TCAR) minus the dollar gain of the acquirer (market cap target * ACAR), divided by the sum of 
the acquirer’s and target’s market capitalization two months prior to the deal announcement, 
following Ahern (2012).  
Purchase Price Allocation Variables 
REL_GW The amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill scaled divided by deal value. 
REL_RD The amount of the purchase price allocated to R&D scaled by deal value. 
REL_TECH The amount of the purchase price allocated to technology scaled by deal value. 
REL_RIGHTS The amount of the purchase price allocated to rights scaled by deal value 
REL_CLIENT The amount of the purchase price allocated to client relationships scaled by deal value. 
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REL_TM The amount of the purchase price allocated to trademarks scaled by deal value. 
REL_INTAN The amount of the purchase price allocated to other identifiable intangibles scaled by deal value. 
REL_TANG The amount of the purchase price allocated to net tangible assets, scaled by deal value. 
Estimated Pre-merger Intangible Assets 
CAPRD_ACQ 
 
The acquirer’s capitalized R&D at the end of the fiscal year prior to deal announcement, 
deflated by total assets. The capitalization schedule follows Lev and Sougiannis (1996). Missing 
R&D is set to zero.  
CAPADV_ACQ 
 
The acquirer’s capitalized advertising expenditures at the end of the fiscal year prior to deal 
announcement, deflated by total assets. The capitalization schedule follows Penman and Zhang 
(2002). Missing advertising expense is set to zero.    
INTAN_ACQ 
 
The acquirer’s recognized intangible assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to deal 
announcement divided by total assets.  
CAPRD_TAR 
 
The target’s capitalized R&D at the end of the fiscal year prior to deal announcement, deflated 
by total assets. The capitalization schedule follows Lev and Sougiannis (1996). Missing R&D is 
set to zero. 
CAPADV_TAR 
 
The target’s capitalized advertising expenditures at the end of the fiscal year prior to deal 
announcement, deflated by total assets. The capitalization schedule follows Penman and Zhang 
(2002). Missing advertising expense is set to zero.   
INTAN_TAR 
 
The target’s recognized intangible assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to deal announcement 
divided by total assets. 
Deal Characteristics 
LDVALUE The natural logarithm of deal value (Pratt’s). 
STOCKONLY An indicator variable that equals one for mergers paid with stock only (SDC). 
HOSTILE An indicator variable that equals one for hostile mergers (SDC). 
MERGER An indicator variable that equals one for mergers of equals (SDC). 
TENDER An indicator variable that equals one for mergers bought by a tender offer (SDC). 
BIDCOMP An indicator variable that equals one for mergers with competing bids (SDC). 
DIVERSIFY An indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer’s and target’s primary two-digit SIC codes 
are different (SDC). 
PROBACQ The pre-deal estimated predicted probability that the acquiring firm is involved in a transaction, 
estimated using Model (4) in Appendix B.  
Merging Firms Characteristics 
SIZE_ACQ The natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market capitalization (in thousands) two months prior to 
the deal announcement. 
BTM_ACQ The acquirer’s book-to-market ratio in the end of the fiscal year prior to the deal announcement. 
Book-to-market ratio is book value of equity divided by market value of equity (Compustat: 
[(SEQ / (PRCC_F * CSHO)]) 
BTM_TAR The target’s book-to-market ratio in the end of the fiscal year prior to the deal announcement. 
Book-to-market ratio is book value of equity divided by market value of equity (Compustat: 
[(SEQ / (PRCC_F * CSHO)]) 
FIRMAGE_ACQ 
 
The number of years the acquirer exists in CRSP up till the end of the fiscal year prior to the 
deal announcement. 
FIRMAGE_TAR 
 
The number of years the target exists in CRSP up till the end of the fiscal year prior to the deal 
announcement. 
RUNUP_ACQ The acquirer’s abnormal buy-and-hold return measured over the one-year period ending two-
months before the deal announcement. Abnormal returns are individual firms’ returns minus 
market return. 
RUNUP_TAR The target’s abnormal buy-and-hold return measured over the one-year period ending two-
months before the deal announcement. Abnormal returns are individual firms’ returns minus 
market return.   
ANALYST_ACQ The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts covering the acquirer in the year prior 
to the deal (IBES) 
ANALYST_TAR The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts covering the target in the year prior to 
the deal. (IBES) 
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Appendix D: Timeline of the Deal and PPA Disclosures 
  
221 days 
97 days 124 days 
10-Q/10-K 
containing detailed 
PPA disclosures 
Effective date of the 
deal 
Announcement date 
of the deal 
Figure 1: This figure reports the timeline of the typical deal in our sample. After the deal is initially 
announced it takes on average 124 days for the deal to be completed (25th percentile: 70 days, median: 107 
days, 75th percentile: 164 days). After deal completion it takes on average 97 days for the purchase price 
allocation to be disclosed, in either a 10-Q or a 10-K, whichever comes first (25th percentile: 69 days, 
median: 91 days, 75th percentile: 117 days). As such from the initial announcement of the deal and the 
initial market reaction we observe, there is a 221-day delay (25th percentile: 158 days, median: 207 days, 
75th percentile: 2617 days) before investors observe the accrual purchase price allocation.  
Timeline of disclosures 
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Table 1 Sample Selection and Comparison 
This table describes the construction of our final sample of 447 completed deals announced between 2001 and 2015. 
Panel A reports the sample selection process and Panel B compares our final sample of 447 deals with the 
SDC/CRSP/Compustat sample of 1,746 deals. Please refer to Appendix C for variable definitions.   
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 No. of 
deals 
2001-2015 SDC completed deals involving public bidders and targets available in Compustat and CRSP    2,755 
Less:   
  Deals with a value less than $5 million    138 
  Deals with a value less than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization 395 
  Deals in which the acquirer already owned more than 50% of the target firm prior to the merger 83 
  Deals with insufficient data in Compustat 393 
SDC/CRSP/Compustat sample before merging with Pratt’s   1,746 
Less:  
  Deals that are not covered by Pratt’s    1,299 
Final Sample  447 
                                              
Panel B: Final Sample versus SDC/CRSP/Compustat Sample before Merging with Pratt’s  
Variable 
Mean of  
final sample  
Mean  
of SDC 
p-value  
diff. mean 
Median of 
final sample 
Median  
of SDC 
p-value  
diff. median 
ACAR -0.011 -0.010 0.78 -0.009 -0.007 0.43 
TCAR 0.265 0.239 0.03 0.230 0.193 0.00 
PCAR 0.029 0.025 0.21 0.018 0.014 0.18 
STOCKONLY 0.195 0.236 0.06 0.000 0.000 0.06 
MERGER 0.016 0.029 0.11 0.000 0.000 0.11 
TENDER 0.204 0.163 0.04 0.000 0.000 0.04 
BIDCOMP 0.031 0.043 0.27 0.000 0.000 0.27 
DIVERSIFY 0.320 0.313 0.78 0.000 0.000 0.78 
SIZE_ACQ 14.838 14.767 0.48 14.659 14.725 0.53 
SIZE_TAR 12.949 12.802 0.13 12.814 12.709 0.36 
BTM_ACQ 0.475 0.519 0.01 0.441 0.461 0.14 
BTM_TAR 0.578 0.677 0.00 0.481 0.531 0.01 
ROA_ACQ 0.041 0.037 0.49 0.046 0.037 0.02 
ROA_TAR -0.016 -0.015 0.97 0.013 0.013 0.95 
FIRMAGE_ACQ 2.775 2.656 0.01 2.833 2.708 0.07 
FIRMAGE_TAR 2.428 2.323 0.02 2.485 2.303 0.00 
RUNUP_ACQ 0.025 0.034 0.32 0.015 0.015 0.88 
RUNUP_TAR 0.067 0.071 0.77 0.031 0.041 0.13 
ANALYST_ACQ 2.291 2.124 0.00 2.398 2.197 0.02 
ANALYST_TAR 1.661 1.496 0.00 1.792 1.609 0.01 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses. We present means, medians, and 
standard deviations based on all 447 mergers in the final sample, and then divide the sample into related mergers 
(N=304) and diversifying mergers (N=143) and present p values for the difference in means or medians between these 
two sub-samples. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for our various wealth effect measures. Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics for the purchase price allocation variables. Panel C reports descriptive statistics for our 
(estimated) pre-merger intangible assets. Panel D reports descriptive statistics on various deal characteristics. Panel   
E reports descriptive statistics on the acquirers and targets involved in the transaction. Please refer to Appendix C for 
variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Wealth Effect Variables 
 All Mergers Related Mergers Diversifying Mergers  
p-value 
diff. mean  
p-value diff.  
median   Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Mean Median 
ACAR -0.011 -0.009 0.073 -0.013 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 0.46 0.46 
PCAR 0.029 0.018 0.070 0.031 0.018 0.024 0.019 0.31 0.89 
TCAR 0.265 0.230 0.225 0.263 0.224 0.268 0.242 0.83 0.46 
PREMIUM 0.404 0.360 0.308 0.405 0.360 0.400 0.360 0.88 1.00 
TGAIN 0.046 0.040 0.065 0.050 0.042 0.038 0.026 0.07 0.04 
ADJ_ACAR 0.006 0.003 0.076 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.63 0.25 
ADJ_PCAR 0.043 0.031 0.071 0.045 0.032 0.037 0.029 0.27 0.50 
ADJ_TGAIN 0.032 0.025 0.068 0.036 0.028 0.025 0.011 0.12 0.02 
WDADJ_ACAR 0.037 0.043 0.084 0.041 0.045 0.030 0.036 0.23 0.26 
WDADJ_PCAR 0.067 0.064 0.078 0.073 0.070 0.054 0.053 0.02 0.01 
WDADJ_TGAIN 0.007 -0.002 0.077 0.007 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.94 0.94 
REL_ACAR 0.116 0.014 0.459 0.102 0.003 0.145 0.030 0.36 0.08 
REL_PCAR 0.268 0.156 0.487 0.252 0.146 0.303 0.191 0.30 0.25 
 
Panel B: Purchase Price Allocation Variables 
 All Mergers Related Mergers Diversifying Mergers 
p-value  
diff. 
mean 
p-value  
diff.  
median  Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Mean Median 
REL_GW 0.439 0.449 0.220 0.409 0.397 0.502 0.544 0.00 0.00 
REL_RD 0.033 0.000 0.110 0.040 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.06 0.01 
REL_TECH 0.047 0.000 0.094 0.048 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.75 0.17 
REL_CLIENT 0.060 0.000 0.103 0.057 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.32 0.07 
REL_RIGHTS 0.016 0.000 0.077 0.021 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.04 0.04 
REL_TM 0.027 0.000 0.083 0.025 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.48 0.25 
REL_INTAN 0.099 0.001 0.164 0.091 0.000 0.116 0.016 0.13 0.18 
REL_TANG 0.280 0.214 0.292 0.310 0.241 0.216 0.153 0.00 0.01 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (Cont.)  
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses. We present means, medians, and 
standard deviations based on all 447 mergers in the final sample, and then divide the sample into related mergers 
(N=304) and diversifying mergers (N=143) and present p values for the difference in means or medians between these 
two sub-samples. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for our various wealth effect measures. Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics for the purchase price allocation variables. Panel C reports descriptive statistics for our 
(estimated) pre-merger intangible assets. Panel D reports descriptive statistics on various deal characteristics. Panel   
E reports descriptive statistics on the acquirers and targets involved in the transaction. Please refer to Appendix C for 
variable definitions. 
 
Panel C: Estimated Pre-merger Intangible Assets 
 All Mergers Related Mergers Diversifying Mergers 
p-value 
diff.  
mean 
p-value  
diff.  
median  Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Mean Median 
CAPRD_ACQ 0.086 0.035 0.105 0.091 0.034 0.075 0.041 0.14 0.89 
CAPADV_ACQ 0.005 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.07 0.38 
INTAN_ACQ 0.234 0.172 0.216 0.218 0.148 0.268 0.215 0.02 0.01 
CAPRD_TAR 0.125 0.048 0.162 0.131 0.039 0.113 0.049 0.27 0.89 
CAPADV_TAR 0.006 0.000 0.014 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.64 0.06 
INTAN_TAR 0.176 0.098 0.199 0.158 0.064 0.215 0.152 0.00 0.00 
 
Panel D: Deal Characteristics 
 All Mergers Related Mergers Diversifying Mergers 
p-value 
diff.  
mean 
p-value  
diff.  
median  Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Mean Median 
LDVALUE 6.472 6.352 1.716 6.442 6.262 6.534 6.524 0.60 0.46 
STOCKONLY 0.195 0.000 0.396 0.220 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.04 0.05 
MERGER 0.016 0.000 0.124 0.016 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.85 0.85 
TENDER 0.204 0.000 0.403 0.201 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.82 0.82 
BIDCOMP 0.031 0.000 0.174 0.039 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.15 0.15 
PROBACQ 0.085 0.064 0.067 0.088 0.071 0.078 0.060 0.13 0.09 
DIVERSIFY 0.320 0.000 0.467 
    
  
 
Panel E: Merging Firms’ Characteristics  
 All Mergers Related Mergers Diversifying Mergers p-value 
diff. 
mean 
p-value  
diff.  
median  Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE_ACQ 14.838 14.659 1.874 14.691 14.549 15.150 15.029 0.02 0.12 
BTM_ACQ 0.475 0.441 0.294 0.493 0.444 0.437 0.411 0.06 0.38 
BTM_TAR 0.578 0.481 0.471 0.606 0.498 0.520 0.397 0.07 0.20 
ROA_ACQ 0.041 0.046 0.109 0.035 0.039 0.054 0.062 0.09 0.00 
ROA_TAR -0.016 0.013 0.178 -0.024 0.009 0.001 0.034 0.16 0.00 
FIRMAGE_ACQ 2.775 2.833 0.830 2.731 2.833 2.869 2.890 0.10 0.78 
FIRMAGE_TAR 2.428 2.485 0.840 2.351 2.398 2.594 2.639 0.00 0.01 
RUNUP_ACQ 0.025 0.015 0.156 0.035 0.023 0.004 0.004 0.05 0.06 
RUNUP_TAR 0.067 0.031 0.227 0.070 0.033 0.060 0.023 0.67 0.38 
ANALYST_ACQ 2.291 2.398 0.775 2.267 2.303 2.340 2.485 0.36 0.13 
ANALYST_TAR 1.661 1.792 0.925 1.649 1.701 1.686 1.792 0.70 0.94 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlations among the variables used in the analyses. Bolded correlation coefficients indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
Please refer to Appendix C for variable definitions.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
1 ACAR 1.00
2 TCAR 0.07 1.00
3 PCAR 0.80 0.26 1.00
4 PREMIUM -0.01 0.51 0.06 1.00
5 TGAIN -0.73 0.20 -0.24 0.09 1.00
6 REL_GW -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.11 1.00
7 REL_RD -0.01 0.16 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 -0.26 1.00
8 REL_TECH 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 1.00
9 REL_CLIENT 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 0.08 -0.13 0.29 1.00
10 REL_RIGHTS 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.09 0.16 0.01 -0.08 1.00
11 REL_TM 0.17 0.03 0.13 -0.07 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.11 -0.03 1.00
12 REL_INTAN -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.28 -0.33 -0.11 -0.19 1.00
13 REL_TANG 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.64 -0.11 -0.22 -0.30 -0.04 -0.17 -0.20 1.00
14 CAPRD_ACQ -0.20 0.00 -0.21 0.03 0.10 -0.05 0.36 0.33 0.05 0.12 -0.09 0.04 -0.22 1.00
15 CAPADV_ACQ 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.09 -0.19 -0.02 1.00
16 INTAN_ACQ 0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.10 0.22 -0.02 0.12 0.25 0.03 0.13 0.14 -0.42 -0.06 0.03 1.00
17 CAPRD_TAR -0.13 0.11 -0.14 0.06 0.08 -0.12 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.11 -0.05 0.08 -0.21 0.72 -0.09 0.05 1.00
18 CAPADV_TAR 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.36 0.08 -0.13 -0.08 0.54 0.12 -0.04 1.00
19 INTAN_TAR 0.07 -0.06 0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.36 -0.03 0.00 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.16 -0.44 0.01 0.14 0.38 -0.06 0.01 1.00
20 SIZE_ACQ 0.09 0.03 -0.10 0.06 -0.26 0.19 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.12 -0.34 -0.02 0.11 0.21 -0.03 0.02 0.18 1.00
21 LDVALUE 0.10 -0.17 0.13 -0.05 -0.03 0.19 0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.17 0.15 0.04 -0.25 -0.18 0.11 0.23 -0.22 0.04 0.26 0.74 1.00
22 STOCKONLY -0.26 -0.16 -0.23 -0.02 0.17 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 0.03 0.18 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.04 0.00 -0.10 -0.23 -0.13 1.00
23 HOSTILE 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 1.00
24 MERGER 0.04 -0.11 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.17 -0.01 1.00
25 TENDER 0.06 0.13 -0.04 0.14 -0.13 0.01 0.19 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.01 -0.16 0.20 0.06 0.10 0.18 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.02 -0.24 0.13 -0.07 1.00
26 BIDCOMP 0.07 -0.08 0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 0.19 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 0.10 0.13 -0.11 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.15 -0.06 -0.01 0.18 0.16 1.00
27 DIVERSIFY 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 0.20 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 -0.10 0.03 0.07 -0.16 -0.06 0.09 0.09 -0.06 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.01 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 1.00
28 BTM_ACQ -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.15 -0.18 -0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 0.35 -0.29 -0.08 -0.15 -0.23 -0.08 -0.19 -0.35 -0.24 0.16 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 1.00
29 BTM_TAR -0.06 0.04 -0.09 0.21 0.02 -0.25 -0.17 -0.15 -0.15 -0.04 -0.17 -0.13 0.46 -0.14 -0.14 -0.26 -0.23 -0.08 -0.15 -0.32 -0.33 0.22 0.01 0.05 -0.14 -0.14 -0.07 0.37 1.00
30 ROA_ACQ 0.08 0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.11 -0.01 -0.13 -0.12 0.13 -0.01 -0.09 0.07 0.07 0.38 0.30 -0.19 0.02 -0.09 0.11 0.06 0.08 -0.16 -0.16 1.00
31 ROA_TAR 0.04 -0.14 0.09 -0.19 0.02 0.16 -0.51 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.10 -0.08 -0.01 -0.37 0.11 0.10 -0.55 0.08 0.04 0.18 0.32 -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.15 -0.05 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.29 1.00
32 FIRMAGE_ACQ 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.15 0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.07 0.01 0.13 -0.13 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.44 0.27 -0.12 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.15 0.10 1.00
33 FIRMAGE_TAR 0.09 0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.14 -0.07 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.01 -0.02 -0.17 0.05 0.06 -0.10 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.27 1.00
34 RUNUP_ACQ -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.10 0.00 0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.13 -0.11 1.00
35 RUNUP_TAR 0.08 -0.27 -0.07 0.37 -0.21 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.15 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.16 1.00
36 ANALYST_ACQ 0.04 0.03 -0.11 0.04 -0.20 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.19 -0.30 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.13 0.78 0.55 -0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.06 0.04 -0.27 -0.27 0.33 0.11 0.30 -0.04 -0.05 0.12 1.00
37 ANALYST_TAR 0.01 -0.15 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.23 -0.33 0.06 0.08 0.23 -0.02 0.04 0.28 0.61 0.73 -0.10 -0.05 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.01 -0.31 -0.36 0.22 0.17 0.16 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.57 1.00
38 PROBACQ 0.00 -0.04 -0.14 0.04 -0.15 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.13 -0.15 -0.03 -0.04 0.23 0.00 -0.08 0.05 0.55 0.39 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.12 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.47 0.31 1.00
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Table 4 Merger Synergies 
This table presents results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of merger synergies on purchase price 
allocations and control variables. Panel A is based on all 447 mergers in the final sample and Panel B splits the sample 
into related (N=304) and diversifying mergers (N=143). We use several different variables to capture merger 
synergies. Column (1) and (2) report the results using the three-day cumulative abnormal returns of a value-weighted 
portfolio of the acquirer and the target (PCAR) as measure of merger synergies. Column (3) uses an adjusted three-
day cumulative abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and target in which the acquirer three-
day return is adjusted for anticipation and signals of the acquirer’s standalone valuation (ADJ_PCAR). Column (4) 
uses an adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and target in 
which, in the spirit of Wang (2018), we adjust the acquirer three-day cumulative abnormal return for the industry 
average withdrawn deal return accumulated from the first day after deal announcement to the first day after deal 
withdrawal of a sample of exogenously withdrawn deals (WDADJ_PCAR). In column (5), we use the adjusted three-
day cumulative abnormal return and measure the dollar price movement on a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer 
and the target, scaled by the value of the deal [(market cap acquirer * ADJ_ACAR) + (market cap target * TCAR) / 
deal value] (REL_PCAR). Purchase price allocations include the amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill, 
R&D, technology, client relationships, rights, trademarks, and other identifiable intangibles divided by deal value 
(REL_GW, REL_RD, REL_TECH, REL_CLIENT, REL_RIGHTS, REL_TM, and REL_INTAN). Please refer to 
Appendix C for other variable definitions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses under the coefficients. Continuous 
non-return variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Returns are truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile. 
All regressions include year-fixed effects and Fama and French 12 industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the acquirer level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-
tailed).   
 
 
Panel A: PCAR, ADJ_PCAR, WDADJ_PCAR, and REL_PCAR: 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable:  PCAR PCAR ADJ_PCAR WDADJ_PCAR REL_PCAR 
REL_GW  -0.013 -0.014 -0.012 -0.131 
  (-0.68) (-0.72) (-0.61) (-1.07) 
REL_RD  0.057* 0.066* 0.065* 0.902*** 
  (1.70) (1.92) (1.92) (3.51) 
REL_TECH  0.093** 0.109*** 0.096** 0.854*** 
  (2.39) (2.67) (2.46) (3.12) 
REL_CLIENT  -0.132*** -0.135*** -0.123*** -0.386 
  (-3.24) (-3.08) (-2.79) (-1.57) 
REL_RIGHTS  -0.003 -0.003 0.011 -0.174 
  (-0.05) (-0.05) (0.24) (-0.72) 
REL_TM  0.014 0.022 0.014 0.178 
  (0.34) (0.49) (0.30) (0.81) 
REL_INTAN  -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 0.067 
  (-0.29) (-0.12) (-0.24) (0.33) 
CAPRD_ACQ  -0.168*** -0.170*** -0.171*** -0.446 
  (-3.10) (-3.04) (-2.98) (-1.06) 
CAPADV_ACQ  -0.233 -0.251 -0.309 -1.894 
  (-0.95) (-0.97) (-1.14) (-1.18) 
INTAN_ACQ  -0.018 -0.024 -0.020 0.103 
  (-0.89) (-1.14) (-0.94) (0.82) 
CAPRD_TAR  -0.020 -0.012 -0.022 -0.294 
  (-0.64) (-0.37) (-0.68) (-1.42) 
CAPADV_TAR  -0.158 -0.139 -0.191 -0.517 
  (-0.54) (-0.44) (-0.62) (-0.34) 
INTAN_TAR  0.041** 0.047** 0.040** 0.021 
  (2.15) (2.30) (2.03) (0.16) 
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SIZE_ACQ -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.017*** 0.171*** 
 (-5.12) (-5.32) (-4.77) (-4.05) (6.00) 
LDVALUE 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.011*** -0.193*** 
 (3.89) (3.62) (2.94) (2.77) (-6.47) 
STOCKONLY -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.022*** -0.034*** -0.030 
 (-4.58) (-4.21) (-2.59) (-3.62) (-0.55) 
MERGER 0.015 0.006 -0.005 0.029 0.182* 
 (0.47) (0.17) (-0.12) (0.91) (1.68) 
TENDER -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.096 
 (-0.56) (-0.71) (-0.62) (-0.77) (-1.47) 
BIDCOMP -0.013 -0.019 -0.014 -0.025 -0.051 
 (-0.73) (-1.17) (-0.75) (-1.42) (-0.39) 
DIVERSIFY -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.004 
 (-0.19) (-0.31) (-0.45) (-0.28) (0.09) 
BTM_ACQ -0.022 -0.030** -0.036** -0.029* -0.142 
 (-1.43) (-2.00) (-2.34) (-1.79) (-1.51) 
BTM_TAR 0.000 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.036 
 (0.01) (-0.61) (-0.70) (-0.49) (-0.66) 
ROA_ACQ 0.036 0.020 0.027 0.021 0.302 
 (0.84) (0.54) (0.70) (0.56) (1.62) 
ROA_TAR 0.009 0.002 0.008 -0.009 0.104 
 (0.43) (0.06) (0.31) (-0.35) (0.58) 
FIRMAGE_ACQ 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 -0.024 
 (1.24) (1.27) (1.09) (1.37) (-0.86) 
FIRMAGE_TAR 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.017 
 (0.16) (0.53) (0.46) (0.37) (0.62) 
RUNUP_ACQ 0.022 0.012 0.016 0.022 0.115 
 (0.87) (0.54) (0.64) (0.92) (0.76) 
RUNUP_TAR -0.014 -0.004 0.000 -0.000 0.142 
 (-0.96) (-0.32) (0.01) (-0.00) (1.26) 
ANALYST_ACQ 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.032 
 (0.52) (0.69) (0.98) (0.81) (0.70) 
ANALYST_TAR -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 
 (-0.78) (-0.59) (-0.61) (-0.94) (-0.17) 
PROBACQ 0.032 0.027  0.042  
 (0.56) (0.47)  (0.69)  
Constant -0.034 0.007 0.054 0.008 1.376*** 
 (-0.44) (0.10) (0.74) (0.10) (3.05) 
      
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Number of Observations 447 447 447 421 447 
Base Model Adj. R-squared  0.239 0.187 0.347 0.278 
Adj. R-squared 0.236 0.281 0.235 0.383 0.306 
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Table 4 Merger Synergies (Cont.) 
This table presents results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of merger synergies on purchase price allocations and control variables. Panel A is based 
on all 447 mergers in the final sample and Panel B splits the sample into related (N=304) and diversifying mergers (N=143). We use several different variables to 
capture merger synergies. Column (1) and (2) report the results using the three-day cumulative abnormal returns of a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and 
the target (PCAR) as measure of merger synergies. Column (3) and (4) use an adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio of the 
acquirer and target in which the acquirer three-day return is adjusted for anticipation and signals of the acquirer’s standalone valuation (ADJ_PCAR). Column (5) 
and (6) use an adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and target in which, in the spirit of Wang (2018), we 
adjust the acquirer three-day cumulative abnormal return for the industry average withdrawn deal return accumulated from the first day after deal announcement 
to the first day after deal withdrawal of a sample of exogenously withdrawn deals (WDADJ_PCAR). In column (7) and (8), we use the adjusted three-day cumulative 
abnormal return and measure the dollar price movement on a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target, scaled by the value of the deal [(market cap 
acquirer * ADJ_ACAR) + (market cap target * TCAR) / deal value] (REL_PCAR). Purchase price allocations include the amount of the purchase price allocated 
to goodwill, R&D, technology, client relationships, rights, trademarks, and other identifiable intangibles divided by deal value (REL_GW, REL_RD, REL_TECH, 
REL_CLIENT, REL_RIGHTS, REL_TM, and REL_INTAN). Please refer to Appendix C for other variable definitions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
under the coefficients. Continuous non-return variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Returns are truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile. All 
regressions include year-fixed effects and Fama and French 12 industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer level. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed).   
 
 
Panel B: Diversifying versus Related Mergers: 
 Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: PCAR PCAR ADJ_PCAR ADJ_PCAR WDADJ_PCAR WDADJ_PCAR REL_PCAR REL_PCAR 
 Diversifying Related Diversifying Related Diversifying Related Diversifying Related 
REL_GW 0.014 -0.015 0.011 -0.018 0.010 -0.012 -0.100 -0.129 
 (0.41) (-0.70) (0.30) (-0.81) (0.27) (-0.56) (-0.36) (-0.82) 
REL_RD 0.007 0.071* 0.034 0.078* -0.002 0.080** -0.043 1.026*** 
 (0.08) (1.73) (0.38) (1.90) (-0.02) (2.01) (-0.06) (3.33) 
REL_TECH 0.071 0.101** 0.081 0.106** 0.076 0.098** 1.153 0.780*** 
 (1.01) (2.14) (1.08) (2.19) (1.02) (2.14) (1.49) (2.69) 
REL_CLIENT -0.140** -0.145*** -0.138* -0.147*** -0.117 -0.140*** -0.758 -0.199 
 (-2.03) (-2.95) (-1.88) (-2.77) (-1.51) (-2.76) (-1.30) (-0.73) 
REL_RIGHTS 0.457** -0.018 0.473** -0.023 0.766*** -0.008 0.223 -0.088 
 (2.44) (-0.37) (2.33) (-0.48) (4.20) (-0.18) (0.20) (-0.35) 
REL_TM -0.046 0.109** -0.030 0.103* -0.097 0.102* -0.054 0.849*** 
 (-0.46) (2.09) (-0.30) (1.90) (-0.75) (1.96) (-0.07) (3.13) 
REL_INTAN -0.026 0.017 -0.014 0.015 -0.030 0.019 -0.289 0.308 
 (-0.56) (0.58) (-0.27) (0.47) (-0.63) (0.63) (-0.74) (1.39) 
CAPRD_ACQ 0.139 -0.257*** 0.134 -0.263*** 0.170 -0.267*** 1.385 -0.871** 
 (1.28) (-3.99) (1.19) (-3.97) (1.42) (-4.03) (1.35) (-2.07) 
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CAPADV_ACQ -0.424 -0.018 -0.416 0.006 -0.181 -0.046 -2.824 -0.569 
 (-0.77) (-0.06) (-0.73) (0.02) (-0.25) (-0.14) (-0.76) (-0.27) 
INTAN_ACQ 0.090** -0.047* 0.079** -0.050* 0.093** -0.045* 0.419 -0.004 
 (2.50) (-1.77) (2.02) (-1.88) (2.28) (-1.72) (1.44) (-0.02) 
CAPRD_TAR -0.036 -0.055 -0.020 -0.054 -0.036 -0.060 -0.449 -0.517** 
 (-0.51) (-1.44) (-0.27) (-1.37) (-0.49) (-1.55) (-0.84) (-1.98) 
CAPADV_TAR -0.093 -0.590* -0.029 -0.601* 0.107 -0.623* -0.822 -2.729* 
 (-0.20) (-1.80) (-0.06) (-1.68) (0.21) (-1.91) (-0.19) (-1.80) 
INTAN_TAR -0.005 0.022 0.007 0.021 0.002 0.015 -0.245 -0.137 
 (-0.15) (0.87) (0.21) (0.79) (0.06) (0.59) (-0.82) (-0.81) 
Constant -0.007 0.015 0.032 0.070 -0.005 0.010 2.603** 1.011** 
 (-0.05) (0.17) (0.21) (0.94) (-0.03) (0.12) (2.00) (1.98) 
         
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 143 304 143 304 133 288 143 304 
Adj. R-squared 0.347 0.325 0.286 0.282 0.452 0.422 0.209 0.352 
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Table 5 Acquirer Wealth Effects 
This table presents results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of acquirer wealth effects on purchase price 
allocations and control variables. Panel A is based on all 447 mergers in the final sample and Panel B splits the sample 
into related (N=304) and diversifying mergers (N=143). We use several different variables to capture acquirer wealth 
effects. Column (1) and (2) report the results using the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the 
announcement date as measure of acquirer wealth effects. Column (3) uses an adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal 
return in which the acquirer three-day return is adjusted for anticipation and signals of the acquirer’s standalone 
valuation (ADJ_ACAR). Column (4) uses an adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal return in which, in the spirit of 
Wang (2018), we adjust the acquirer three-day cumulative abnormal return for the industry average withdrawn deal 
return accumulated from the first day after deal announcement to the first day after deal withdrawal of a sample of 
exogenously withdrawn deals (WDADJ_ACAR). In column (5), we use the adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal 
return and measure the dollar price movement of the acquirer, scaled by the value of the deal [(market cap acquirer * 
ADJ_ACAR) / deal value] (REL_ACAR). Purchase price allocations include the amount of the purchase price 
allocated to goodwill, R&D, technology, client relationships, rights, trademarks, and other identifiable intangibles 
divided by deal value (REL_GW, REL_RD, REL_TECH, REL_CLIENT, REL_RIGHTS, REL_TM, and 
REL_INTAN). Please refer to Appendix C for other variable definitions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses under 
the coefficients. Continuous non-return variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Returns are truncated at 
the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile. All regressions include year-fixed effects and Fama and French 12 industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively (two-tailed).   
 
Panel A: ACAR, ADJ_ACAR, WDADJ_ACAR, and REL_ACAR: 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable:  ACAR ACAR ADJ_ACAR WDADJ_ACAR REL_ACAR 
REL_GW  -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.039** -0.224* 
  (-2.68) (-2.60) (-2.16) (-1.90) 
REL_RD  0.026 0.030 0.021 0.667** 
  (0.72) (0.81) (0.60) (2.55) 
REL_TECH  0.074 0.089* 0.082* 0.692** 
  (1.58) (1.77) (1.76) (2.56) 
REL_CLIENT  -0.090* -0.095* -0.094* -0.310 
  (-1.75) (-1.71) (-1.78) (-1.25) 
REL_RIGHTS  0.006 0.006 0.009 -0.269 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.17) (-1.16) 
REL_TM  0.054 0.062 0.066 0.074 
  (1.16) (1.23) (1.35) (0.32) 
REL_INTAN  -0.016 -0.014 -0.018 0.006 
  (-0.59) (-0.48) (-0.64) (0.03) 
CAPRD_ACQ  -0.135** -0.135* -0.121* -0.272 
  (-1.99) (-1.95) (-1.78) (-0.67) 
CAPADV_ACQ  -0.235 -0.263 -0.347 -1.899 
  (-0.78) (-0.83) (-1.13) (-1.09) 
INTAN_ACQ  -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 0.110 
  (-0.20) (-0.38) (-0.13) (0.89) 
CAPRD_TAR  -0.052 -0.039 -0.055 -0.379* 
  (-1.33) (-0.97) (-1.42) (-1.78) 
CAPADV_TAR  -0.103 -0.085 -0.163 -0.582 
  (-0.28) (-0.21) (-0.42) (-0.37) 
INTAN_TAR  0.049** 0.057** 0.051** 0.065 
  (2.24) (2.42) (2.30) (0.52) 
SIZE_ACQ -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.154*** 
 (-0.05) (-0.04) (0.30) (0.03) (5.27) 
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LDVALUE 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.168*** 
 (0.22) (-0.37) (-0.80) (-0.02) (-5.69) 
STOCKONLY -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.014 -0.031*** 0.002 
 (-4.02) (-3.59) (-1.57) (-3.34) (0.04) 
MERGER 0.056* 0.051 0.048 0.059* 0.216** 
 (1.77) (1.54) (1.32) (1.72) (2.31) 
TENDER -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.112* 
 (-0.51) (-0.63) (-0.55) (-1.06) (-1.69) 
BIDCOMP 0.005 0.002 0.011 0.003 0.011 
 (0.28) (0.08) (0.52) (0.18) (0.09) 
DIVERSIFY 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.006 
 (0.68) (0.73) (0.39) (0.53) (0.13) 
BTM_ACQ -0.003 -0.010 -0.018 -0.007 -0.123 
 (-0.16) (-0.61) (-1.00) (-0.40) (-1.38) 
BTM_TAR 0.000 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006 -0.084 
 (0.02) (-1.11) (-1.22) (-0.73) (-1.61) 
ROA_ACQ 0.026 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.266 
 (0.57) (0.25) (0.31) (0.18) (1.44) 
ROA_TAR -0.011 -0.034 -0.023 -0.050* 0.033 
 (-0.48) (-1.17) (-0.78) (-1.78) (0.18) 
FIRMAGE_ACQ -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.028 
 (-0.18) (0.31) (0.21) (0.48) (-1.01) 
FIRMAGE_TAR 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.012 
 (0.42) (0.78) (0.79) (0.72) (0.45) 
RUNUP_ACQ 0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.069 
 (0.01) (-0.15) (0.05) (-0.13) (0.48) 
RUNUP_TAR 0.039** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.263** 
 (2.57) (3.40) (3.41) (3.16) (2.50) 
ANALYST_ACQ 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.033 
 (0.21) (0.53) (0.85) (0.64) (0.74) 
ANALYST_TAR -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.003 
 (-1.33) (-1.24) (-1.19) (-1.57) (-0.10) 
PROBACQ 0.094 0.078  0.063  
 (1.47) (1.21)  (0.95)  
Constant -0.035 0.010 0.044 -0.041 1.098** 
 (-0.43) (0.12) (0.56) (-0.50) (2.45) 
      
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Number of Observations 447 447 447 421 447 
Base Model Adj. R-squared  0.173 0.135 0.387 0.225 
Adj. R-squared 0.173 0.204 0.165 0.409 0.247 
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Table 5 Acquirer Wealth Effects (Cont.) 
This table presents results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of acquirer wealth effects on purchase price allocations and control variables. Panel A is 
based on all 447 mergers in the final sample and Panel B splits the sample into related (N=304) and diversifying mergers (N=143). We use several different 
variables to capture acquirer wealth effects. Column (1) and (2) report the results using the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date 
as measure of acquirer wealth effects. Column (3) and (4) use an adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal return in which the acquirer three-day return is adjusted 
for anticipation and signals of the acquirer’s standalone valuation (ADJ_ACAR). Column (5) and (6) use an adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal return in 
which, in the spirit of Wang (2018), we adjust the acquirer three-day cumulative abnormal return for the industry average withdrawn deal return accumulated from 
the first day after deal announcement to the first day after deal withdrawal of a sample of exogenously withdrawn deals (WDADJ_ACAR). In column (7) and (8), 
we use the adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal return and measure the dollar price movement of the acquirer, scaled by the value of the deal [(market cap 
acquirer * ADJ_ACAR) / deal value] (REL_ACAR). Purchase price allocations include the amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill, R&D, technology, 
client relationships, rights, trademarks, and other identifiable intangibles divided by deal value (REL_GW, REL_RD, REL_TECH, REL_CLIENT, REL_RIGHTS, 
REL_TM, and REL_INTAN). Please refer to Appendix C for other variable definitions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses under the coefficients. Continuous 
non-return variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Returns are truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile. All regressions include year-fixed effects 
and Fama and French 12 industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively (two-tailed).   
 
Panel B: Diversifying versus Related Mergers: 
 Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: ACAR ACAR ADJ_ACAR ADJ_ACAR WDADJ_ACAR WDADJ_ACAR REL_ACAR REL_ACAR 
 Diversifying Related Diversifying Related Diversifying Related Diversifying Related 
REL_GW -0.029 -0.051** -0.034 -0.054** -0.042 -0.037* -0.221 -0.211 
 (-0.85) (-2.25) (-0.90) (-2.26) (-1.24) (-1.65) (-0.80) (-1.39) 
REL_RD -0.067 0.027 -0.043 0.028 -0.113 0.023 -0.156 0.818*** 
 (-0.73) (0.64) (-0.44) (0.64) (-1.10) (0.57) (-0.22) (2.66) 
REL_TECH 0.085 0.074 0.098 0.078 0.088 0.081 1.017 0.626** 
 (1.08) (1.34) (1.22) (1.32) (1.11) (1.49) (1.41) (2.16) 
REL_CLIENT -0.089 -0.094* -0.093 -0.097 -0.091 -0.094* -0.748 -0.018 
 (-1.00) (-1.69) (-0.97) (-1.58) (-1.00) (-1.68) (-1.33) (-0.07) 
REL_RIGHTS 0.433** -0.020 0.455** -0.027 0.563*** -0.015 -0.071 -0.135 
 (2.08) (-0.36) (2.06) (-0.46) (3.25) (-0.27) (-0.07) (-0.54) 
REL_TM -0.043 0.157*** -0.031 0.153** -0.062 0.162*** -0.373 0.843*** 
 (-0.50) (2.76) (-0.34) (2.49) (-0.68) (2.96) (-0.55) (3.23) 
REL_INTAN -0.022 0.002 -0.011 -0.002 -0.021 0.003 -0.332 0.260 
 (-0.42) (0.07) (-0.19) (-0.05) (-0.39) (0.10) (-0.92) (1.14) 
CAPRD_ACQ 0.247* -0.228*** 0.241* -0.228*** 0.254* -0.210** 1.612 -0.721* 
 (1.76) (-2.83) (1.68) (-2.76) (1.69) (-2.59) (1.61) (-1.76) 
CAPADV_ACQ -0.920 0.459 -0.907 0.467 -0.937 0.340 -3.406 0.512 
 (-1.41) (1.25) (-1.35) (1.17) (-1.25) (0.96) (-0.95) (0.24) 
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INTAN_ACQ 0.096** -0.028 0.084* -0.031 0.097** -0.022 0.353 0.046 
 (2.16) (-0.93) (1.82) (-0.94) (2.07) (-0.73) (1.25) (0.30) 
CAPRD_TAR -0.112 -0.080* -0.087 -0.077 -0.103 -0.081* -0.550 -0.590** 
 (-1.38) (-1.67) (-1.04) (-1.58) (-1.29) (-1.70) (-1.08) (-2.15) 
CAPADV_TAR 0.375 -0.747* 0.436 -0.764 0.540 -0.784* 0.022 -3.415** 
 (0.73) (-1.75) (0.81) (-1.57) (0.98) (-1.84) (0.01) (-2.23) 
INTAN_TAR 0.023 0.022 0.036 0.023 0.024 0.019 -0.119 -0.112 
 (0.66) (0.75) (0.98) (0.72) (0.67) (0.63) (-0.43) (-0.67) 
Constant 0.025 -0.007 0.052 0.042 0.057 -0.067 2.275* 0.719 
 (0.15) (-0.08) (0.32) (0.49) (0.29) (-0.74) (1.74) (1.42) 
         
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 143 304 143 304 133 288 143 304 
Adjusted R-squared 0.303 0.238 0.270 0.195 0.528 0.420 0.182 0.287 
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Table 6 Takeover Premium and Distribution of Gains 
This table presents results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of premium and the relative gain to the target 
firm on purchase price allocations and control variables. Panel A is based on all 447 mergers in the final sample and 
Panel B splits the sample into related mergers (N=304) and diversifying mergers (N=143). The results on premium 
reported in column (1) and (2) are based on a premium that is calculated as the initial offer price, or the final offer 
price if the initial offer price is missing, divided by the target’s stock price two months prior to the deal announcement, 
minus one (i.e., [(offer price / pre-merger price) -1]. If the calculated premium if greater than zero, in line with prior 
literature we set it to missing. In column (3) and (4) we report results on the relative gain to the target firm (TGAIN) 
which is calculated as the dollar gain of the target (i.e., market cap target * TCAR) minus the dollar gain of the acquirer 
(market cap acquirer * ACAR), divided by the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s market capitalization two months 
prior to the deal announcement. Column (5) reports the results using an adjusted relative gain (ADJ_TGAIN) to the 
target in which the acquirer return is adjusted for anticipation and signals of the acquirer’s standalone valuation 
(market cap acquirer * ADJ_ACAR). Column (6) reports the results using an adjusted relative gain (WDADJ_TGAIN) 
to the target in which, in the spirit of Wang (2018), we adjust the acquirer three-day cumulative abnormal return for 
the industry average withdrawn deal return accumulated from the first day after deal announcement to the first day 
after deal withdrawal of a sample of exogenously withdrawn deals. Purchase price allocations include the amount of 
the purchase price allocated to goodwill, R&D, technology, client relationships, rights, trademarks, and other 
identifiable intangibles divided by deal value (REL_GW, REL_RD, REL_TECH, REL_CLIENT, REL_RIGHTS, 
REL_TM, and REL_INTAN). Please refer to Appendix C for other variable definitions. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses under the coefficients. Continuous non-return variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Returns are truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile. All regressions include year-fixed effects and Fama and French 
12 industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed).   
 
Panel A: Premium, TGAIN, ADJ_TGAIN, and WDADJ_TGAIN: 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable:  Premium Premium TGAIN  TGAIN ADJ_ TGAIN WDADJ_ TGAIN  
REL_GW  0.268***  0.062*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 
  (2.98)  (4.05) (3.88) (3.69) 
REL_RD  0.435**  0.003 -0.005 0.006 
  (2.07)  (0.09) (-0.14) (0.20) 
REL_TECH  0.511***  -0.038 -0.050 -0.043 
  (2.86)  (-0.94) (-1.14) (-1.04) 
REL_CLIENT  -0.018  0.017 0.022 0.009 
  (-0.12)  (0.45) (0.52) (0.24) 
REL_RIGHTS  0.500**  -0.007 -0.009 -0.014 
  (2.27)  (-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.32) 
REL_TM  0.321  -0.043 -0.052 -0.033 
  (1.64)  (-1.13) (-1.30) (-0.86) 
REL_INTAN  0.370**  0.007 0.007 0.008 
  (2.45)  (0.31) (0.28) (0.33) 
CAPRD_ACQ  -0.412  0.032 0.040 0.019 
  (-1.38)  (0.60) (0.71) (0.36) 
CAPADV_ACQ  -0.857  0.122 0.107 0.221 
  (-0.68)  (0.44) (0.38) (0.78) 
INTAN_ACQ  0.023  -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 
  (0.27)  (-0.84) (-0.77) (-0.88) 
CAPRD_TAR  -0.233  0.076** 0.065* 0.073** 
  (-1.20)  (2.21) (1.88) (2.15) 
CAPADV_TAR  0.144  -0.021 -0.017 0.149 
  (0.12)  (-0.07) (-0.05) (0.50) 
INTAN_TAR  -0.123  -0.032* -0.037* -0.035* 
  (-1.45)  (-1.70) (-1.81) (-1.81) 
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SIZE_ACQ 0.037** 0.025 -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.025*** 
 (2.09) (1.33) (-5.02) (-4.96) (-5.62) (-6.00) 
LDVALUE -0.019 -0.018 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (-1.15) (-1.13) (4.23) (4.71) (5.06) (4.95) 
STOCKONLY -0.039 -0.037 0.010 0.007 -0.007 0.007 
 (-0.95) (-0.93) (1.35) (1.06) (-0.93) (0.96) 
MERGER -0.153** -0.172** -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.050** 
 (-2.25) (-1.97) (-3.70) (-3.62) (-3.62) (-2.55) 
TENDER 0.035 0.026 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 
 (1.01) (0.75) (0.52) (0.60) (0.57) (0.61) 
BIDCOMP -0.094 -0.097 -0.021 -0.021 -0.028 -0.020 
 (-1.61) (-1.52) (-1.33) (-1.43) (-1.54) (-1.31) 
DIVERSIFY -0.006 -0.019 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 
 (-0.19) (-0.61) (-1.16) (-1.30) (-0.90) (-1.15) 
BTM_ACQ -0.032 -0.041 -0.003 0.001 0.008 -0.006 
 (-0.46) (-0.63) (-0.27) (0.11) (0.58) (-0.42) 
BTM_TAR 0.124** 0.166*** 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.003 
 (2.22) (3.19) (0.04) (1.35) (1.31) (0.42) 
ROA_ACQ -0.014 0.023 0.011 0.016 0.010 0.027 
 (-0.08) (0.14) (0.31) (0.46) (0.26) (0.76) 
ROA_TAR -0.313*** -0.383** 0.012 0.043* 0.038 0.062*** 
 (-2.69) (-2.53) (0.62) (1.71) (1.48) (2.68) 
FIRMAGE_ACQ -0.008 -0.016 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (-0.46) (-0.83) (0.99) (0.27) (0.34) (0.59) 
FIRMAGE_TAR 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.68) (0.67) (0.52) (0.16) (-0.02) (0.34) 
RUNUP_ACQ 0.263*** 0.242*** 0.023 0.022 0.016 0.028 
 (2.89) (2.71) (0.96) (0.95) (0.66) (1.11) 
RUNUP_TAR 0.440*** 0.452*** -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.071*** 
 (6.42) (6.67) (-5.22) (-5.89) (-5.80) (-5.25) 
ANALYST_ACQ -0.021 -0.017 -0.003 -0.006 -0.010 -0.007 
 (-0.65) (-0.52) (-0.54) (-1.01) (-1.47) (-1.04) 
ANALYST_TAR -0.003 -0.003 0.008* 0.008* 0.009* 0.011** 
 (-0.14) (-0.13) (1.69) (1.71) (1.77) (2.09) 
PROBACQ 0.000 -0.070 -0.106* -0.090  -0.086 
 (0.00) (-0.29) (-1.88) (-1.63)  (-1.45) 
Constant 0.264 0.328 0.011 -0.024 -0.046 0.025 
 (0.87) (1.05) (0.14) (-0.36) (-0.70) (0.36) 
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Number of Observations 436 436 447 447 447 421 
Base Model Adj. R-squared  0.238  0.283 0.277 0.488 
Adj. R-squared 0.238 0.275 0.283 0.310 0.300 0.504 
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Table 6 Takeover Premium and Distribution of Gains (Cont.) 
This table presents results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of premium and the relative gain to the target firm on purchase price allocations and 
control variables. Panel A is based on all 447 mergers in the final sample and Panel B splits the sample into related mergers (N=304) and diversifying mergers 
(N=143). The results on premium reported in column (1) and (2) are based on a premium that is calculated as the initial offer price, or the final offer price if the 
initial offer price is missing, divided by the target’s stock price two months prior to the deal announcement, minus one (i.e., [(offer price / pre-merger price) -1]. If 
the calculated premium if greater than zero, in line with prior literature we set it to missing. In column (3) and (4) we report results on the relative gain to the target 
firm (TGAIN) which is calculated as the dollar gain of the target (i.e., market cap target * TCAR) minus the dollar gain of the acquirer (market cap acquirer * 
ACAR), divided by the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s market capitalization two months prior to the deal announcement. Column (5) and (6) report the results 
using an adjusted relative gain (ADJ_TGAIN) to the target in which the acquirer return is adjusted for anticipation and signals of the acquirer’s standalone valuation 
(market cap acquirer * ADJ_ACAR). Column (7) and (8) report the results using an adjusted relative gain (WDADJ_TGAIN) to the target in which, in the spirit 
of Wang (2018), we adjust the acquirer three-day cumulative abnormal return for the industry average withdrawn deal return accumulated from the first day after 
deal announcement to the first day after deal withdrawal of a sample of exogenously withdrawn deals. Purchase price allocations include the amount of the purchase 
price allocated to goodwill, R&D, technology, client relationships, rights, trademarks, and other identifiable intangibles divided by deal value (REL_GW, REL_RD, 
REL_TECH, REL_CLIENT, REL_RIGHTS, REL_TM, and REL_INTAN). Please refer to Appendix C for other variable definitions. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses under the coefficients. Continuous non-return variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Returns are truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th 
percentile. All regressions include year-fixed effects and Fama and French 12 industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer level. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
 Panel B: Diversifying versus Related Mergers: 
 Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: Premium Premium TGAIN TGAIN ADJ_TGAIN ADJ_TGAIN WDADJ_TGAIN WDADJ_TGAIN 
 Diversifying Related Diversifying Related Diversifying Related Diversifying Related 
REL_GW 0.287** 0.311*** 0.067** 0.057*** 0.070** 0.060*** 0.078*** 0.049** 
 (2.01) (2.91) (2.50) (2.78) (2.44) (2.74) (2.63) (2.31) 
REL_RD 0.167 0.280 0.055 0.008 0.033 0.002 0.092 0.013 
 (0.36) (1.07) (0.63) (0.21) (0.38) (0.06) (0.98) (0.34) 
REL_TECH 0.134 0.442** -0.043 -0.033 -0.063 -0.037 -0.043 -0.035 
 (0.32) (2.22) (-0.66) (-0.68) (-0.92) (-0.71) (-0.63) (-0.72) 
REL_CLIENT 0.057 -0.136 0.091 -0.050 0.102 -0.047 0.073 -0.048 
 (0.20) (-0.73) (1.27) (-1.10) (1.36) (-0.92) (0.94) (-1.02) 
REL_RIGHTS 1.138** 0.443* -0.191 0.004 -0.221 0.008 -0.377** -0.007 
 (2.09) (1.69) (-1.25) (0.08) (-1.37) (0.17) (-2.44) (-0.15) 
REL_TM 0.780* -0.053 0.061 -0.132*** 0.045 -0.131*** 0.098 -0.116*** 
 (1.69) (-0.25) (0.77) (-2.95) (0.55) (-2.68) (1.26) (-2.78) 
REL_INTAN 0.200 0.393** 0.023 -0.008 0.020 -0.005 0.038 -0.011 
 (0.83) (2.11) (0.46) (-0.26) (0.37) (-0.15) (0.73) (-0.36) 
CAPRD_ACQ 0.152 -0.404 -0.153 0.064 -0.141 0.072 -0.153 0.052 
 (0.30) (-1.22) (-1.48) (0.98) (-1.38) (1.05) (-1.35) (0.80) 
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CAPADV_ACQ 2.135 -2.470 0.565 -0.696** 0.522 -0.733** 0.520 -0.436 
 (0.98) (-1.55) (1.20) (-2.07) (1.06) (-2.05) (0.91) (-1.34) 
INTAN_ACQ 0.296* -0.004 -0.054 -0.019 -0.053 -0.017 -0.048 -0.023 
 (1.89) (-0.03) (-1.43) (-0.68) (-1.35) (-0.59) (-1.17) (-0.84) 
CAPRD_TAR 0.096 -0.217 0.127* 0.083* 0.107 0.082* 0.107 0.080* 
 (0.30) (-0.88) (1.72) (1.97) (1.45) (1.93) (1.42) (1.88) 
CAPADV_TAR -3.780 1.395 -0.449 0.535 -0.412 0.551 -0.462 0.720* 
 (-1.48) (0.97) (-1.04) (1.41) (-0.95) (1.28) (-0.95) (1.91) 
INTAN_TAR -0.294** -0.154 -0.041 -0.003 -0.047 -0.003 -0.043 -0.002 
 (-2.01) (-1.27) (-1.34) (-0.10) (-1.51) (-0.10) (-1.35) (-0.06) 
Constant 0.766 0.291 -0.124 0.049 -0.115 0.008 -0.104 0.099 
 (1.13) (0.86) (-0.84) (0.56) (-0.80) (0.10) (-0.57) (1.07) 
         
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 138 298 143 304 143 304 133 288 
Adjusted R-squared 0.472 0.272 0.362 0.299 0.368 0.289 0.564 0.482 
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Table 7 Information Content of the 10-Q/10-K containing the first PPA disclosure 
This table presents results from tests investigating the information content of the disclosure of the purchase price 
allocation. The sample consists of 427 deals announced between 2001 and 2015 for which we could find a 10-Q or 
10-K filing containing detailed PPA disclosures. Panel A presents the results of tests investigating whether the signed 
three-day abnormal (size-adjusted) return (ABNRET_SZ) around the 10-Q or 10-K that contains the PPA disclosure is 
significantly different from zero. Panel B presents the results of tests investigating the abnormal variance in the three-
day window (ABSRET_SZ) surrounding the 10-Q or 10-K that contains the PPA disclosure. Panel C investigates 
whether the deal announcement returns are correlation with the returns around the PPA disclosure date. Panel D 
replicates the main test results, replacing deal announcement returns with the return around the PPA disclosure date. 
Purchase price allocations include the amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill, R&D, technology, client 
relationships, rights, trademarks, and other identifiable intangibles divided by deal value (REL_GW, REL_RD, 
REL_TECH, REL_CLIENT, REL_RIGHTS, REL_TM, and REL_INTAN). Results reported under the column “All” 
include all deals for which we could find a 10-Q or 10-K filing containing detailed PPA disclosures. We subsequently 
drop 10-Q’s or 10-K’s for which there is a concurrent earnings announcement in the (-1,0) or (-2,0) window. In Panels 
A and B, p-values are reported in parentheses under the coefficients. In Panels C and D, we report the t-values on the 
respective regression coefficients and winsorized non-return variables at the 1st and 99th percentile. The regression 
includes year-fixed effects and Fama and French 12 industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer 
level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed).   
Panel A: Signed Announcement Returns around the 10-Q/10-K 
         
 All   Dropping overlap -1,0   Dropping overlap -2,0 
ABNRET_SZ 
Mean -0.64%***  Mean -0.21%  Mean 0.02% 
 (0.007)   (0.327)   (0.923) 
Median -0.46%***  Median -0.24%  Median -0.06% 
 (0.001)   (0.115)   (0.583) 
N 427   316   289 
Panel B: Relative Absolute Returns around the 10-Q/10-K 
         
 All   Dropping overlap -1,0   Dropping overlap -2,0 
ABSRET_SZ 
Mean 0.40***  Mean 0.12**  Mean 0.07 
 (0.000)   (0.031)   (0.199) 
Median 0.13***  Median -0.02  Median -0.06 
 (0.000)   (0.751)   (0.427) 
N 427   316   289 
Panel C: Regression of ACAR, PCAR, & TCAR  on 10-Q/10-K announcement returns  
 All   Dropping overlap -1,0   Dropping overlap -2,0 
ABNRET_SZ, ACAR 0.029  0.224*  0.212 
 
(0.71)  (1.84)  (1.56) 
 Adj. R2 : –0.002  Adj. R2 : 0.012  Adj. R2 : 0.008 
ABNRET_SZ, TCAR 0.101  0.377  0.461* 
 
(0.55)  (1.51)  (1.72) 
 Adj. R2 : –0.002  Adj. R2 : 0.001  Adj. R2 : 0.002 
ABNRET_SZ, PCAR -0.057  0.128  0.131 
 
(0.78)  (1.31)  (1.22) 
 Adj. R2 : –0.001  Adj. R2 : 0.002  Adj. R2 : 0.002 
N 427   316   289 
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Panel D: Replacing deal announcement CARs with 10-Q/10-K announcement returns 
         
 All   Dropping overlap -1,0   Dropping overlap -2,0 
REL_GW -0.014  0.004  0.006 
 (-1.07)  (0.29)  (0.46) 
REL_RD -0.016  0.003  -0.011 
 (-0.43)  (0.08)  (-0.31) 
REL_TECH -0.001  0.005  0.040 
 (-0.03)  (0.14)  (0.99) 
REL_CLIENT -0.055  -0.012  -0.036 
 (-1.63)  (-0.42)  (-1.35) 
REL_RIGHTS 0.058**  0.074***  0.049 
 (2.16)  (2.69)  (1.44) 
REL_TM 0.072*  0.032  0.017 
 (1.86)  (0.89)  (0.54) 
REL_INTAN 0.007  0.013  0.010 
 (0.36)  (0.70)  (0.53) 
Controls Included  Included  Included 
N 427   316   289 
 
